Please help with the following T/F Game Theory Qs, no need for explanation

(1) A strictly dominated action can never be played in any pure strategy Nash equilib rium. (2) A weakly dominated action can never be played with positive probability in any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.(1) A two-by-two strategic game (2 players, 2 actions each ) can have at most one STRICT Nash equilibrium. (2) A WEAKLY dominated strategy can never be played in any STRICT Nash equilib rium. (3) Consider a strategic game, in which player i has two actions, a and b. Let s_; be some strategy profile of her opponents. If a is STRICTLY dominated for i, it MUST be strictly dominated by b. (4) Consider the same game in (3). If a is WEAKLY dominated for i, it MUST be weakly dominated by b.(5) Consider the same game in (3). If a IS NOT a best response to s_;, then a is strictly dominated by b. (6) Consider the same game in (3). If a IS NOT a best response to s_;, then a does NOT strictly dominates b. (7) Consider the same game in (3). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities = and , to a and b, respectively. IS a best response to s_;, SO IS a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities , and , to a and b, respectively. 8) Consider the same game in (3). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities and , to a and b. respectively, is NOT a best response to some strategy profile of her opponents, S_;, NEITHER is a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities , and - to a and b, respectively. (9) Consider the same game in (3). If a IS a best response to s_;, SO IS any mixed strategy that assigns positive probability to a. (10) Consider the same game in (3). If a IS NOT a best response to s_;, NEITHER IS any mixed strategy that assigns positive probability to a