please help with this case debrief, long thought out explanation with several paragraphs and every single question answered:

Facts: present only the facts are essential to the court's decision

Issue: (1) What questions of law has the court identified as issues to be decided in the case before it?

(2) Does the case before the court also involve underlying issues of public policy or constitutional interpretation?

Rules of Law: Identify the rules of cases and statutory law that the curt identifies in its opinion as integral to the decision making process.

Conclusion: What is the holding of the court?

1.Rule of Law of the case

2.Disposition of the case

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 - Supreme Court 2008 - Google Scholar 1/19/14 11:34 AM 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Petitioners, Dick Anthony HELLER. No. 07-290. Supreme Court of United States. Argued March 18, 2008. Decided June 26, 2008. 2787 *2787 Walter Dellinger, for petitioners. Paul D. Clement, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court. Alan Gura, for respondent. Thomas C. Goldstein, Christopher M. Egleson, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Washington, DC, Walter Dellinger, Matthew M. Shors, Mark S. Davies, Brianne J. Gorod, Not admitted in D.C.; supervised by principals of the firm, Joseph Blocher, Not admitted in D.C.; supervised by principals of the firm, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, DC, Peter J. Nickles, Interim Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor, General, Lutz Alexander Prager, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, Robert A. Long, Jonathan L. Marcus, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Alan Gura, Counsel of Record, Robert A. Levy, Clark M. Neily III, Gura & Possessky, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Respondents. Frederick L. Whitmer, Thelen Reid Brown, Raysman & Steiner LLP, New York, NY, Charles M. Dyke, Counsel of Record, Thelen Reid Brown, Raysman & Steiner LLP, San Francisco, CA, Charles M. English, Jeffrey R. Gans, Elizabeth M. Walsh, Emily A. Jones, Laura P. Bourgeois, Thelen Reid Brown, Raysman & Steiner LLP, Washington, DC, for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D., Richard W. Bailey, Ph.D. and Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Ph.D. in Support of Petitioners. Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 2788 We consider whether a District of Columbia prohibition on the possession of *2788 usable handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment to the Constitution. http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=district+of+columbia+v.+...er&hl=en&as_sdt=400006&as_vis=1&case=2739870581644084946&scilh=0 Page 1 of 84Dlsxrler of Columbia v. neller, 125 541.2753 , supreme Court 2005 , coogle Scholar 1/19/14 11-3 AM The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered rearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited, See D.C.Code 7-2501 .01 (12), 7-2502.01(a), 7- 2502.02(a)(4) (2001). Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the chief of police may issue licenses for 1-year periods. See 22-4504(a), 22-4506. District of Columbia law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned rearms, such as registered long guns, "unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device" unless they are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities See 745010211] Respondent Dick Heller is a DC. special police ofcer authorized to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center. He applied for a registration certicate for a handgun that he wished to keep at home, but the District refused He thereafter led a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a rearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of "functional rearms within the home.'I App. 59a. The District Court dismissed respondent's complaint, see Wm 311 F.Supp.2d 103 109 (2004 . The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, construing his complaint as seeking the right to render a rearm operable and cany it about his home in that condition only when necessary for selfdefensem reversed, see r r . Di ' m i 4 F. 1 2 7 . It held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess rearms and that the city's total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that rearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated that right. See id., at 395, 399-401. The Court of Appeals directed the District Court to enter summaryjudgment for respondent. We granted certiorari. 552 us. _, 123 set. 645, 169 L.Ed.2d 417 (2001). We turn rst to the meaning of the Second Amendment, A The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right ofthe people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters: its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning." Wye. 2&2 u.. 71 731 51 .Qt. 229 7g L.Eg.4(121t;see also i n v. n Wh t. 1 1 23 (1524). Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation. olsuler at Columbia v. Keller, 12: $451,273: , supreme Court 2005 , coogle Scholar 1/19/14 11:34 AM today's dissenting Justices believe that it protects only the right to possess and carry a rearm in connection with militia service. See Brief for Petitioners 11-12; post, at 2822 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Respondent argues that it protects an individual right to possess a rearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes. such as self-defense within the home. See Brief for Respondent 2- 4. The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative clause. The former does not limit the latter grammatically. but rather announces a purpose. The Amendment could be rephrased, "Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State. the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.\" See J. Tiffany, A Treatise on Government and Constitutional Law 535, p. 394 (1867); Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English as Amici Curiae 3 (hereinafter Linguists' Brief). Although this structure of the Second Amendment is unique in our Constitution. other legal documents of the founding era, particularly individual-rights provisions of state constitutions, commonly included a prefatory statement of purpose. See generally Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U,L.Rev. 793, 814-821 (1998). Logic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and the command. The Second Amendment would be nonsensical if it read, "A well regulated Militia. being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to petition for redress of grievances shall not be infringed." That requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause ("The separation of church and state being an important objective, the teachings of canons shall have no place in our jurisprudence!I The preface makes clear that the operative clause refers not to canons of interpretation but to clergymen.) But apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the opelative clause. See F. Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes 263-269 (P. Potter ed. 1871) (hereinafter Dwarris); T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 4245 (2d ed. 1870111 "'It is nothing unusual in acts . , . for the enacting part to go beyond the preamble; the remedy often extends beyond the particular act or mischief which rst suggested the necessity of the law)" J. Bishop, Commentaries on Written Laws and Their Interpretation 51, p. 49 (1882) (quoting Rgx v. Marks, ). Therefore, while we will begin '2790 our textual analysis with the operative clause, we will return to the prefatory clause to ensure that our reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose?\" 1. Operative Clause. a, "Right of the People." The rst salient feature of the operative clause is that it codifies a "right of the people." The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights use the phrase "right of the people" two other times, in the First Amendment's Assembly-and-Petition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment's Search-and- Seizure Clause. The Ninth Amendment uses very similar terminology ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"). All three of 2789 \"2789 The two sides in this case have set out very different interpretations of the Amendment, Petitioners and "1959 instances unambiguously refer '0 individual rights, "0t "collective" rights, or rights that may be imp:I[scholangoogIuorn/scholar_case?q=dlsrrlmot+eolumblaev.e.. erdrhl=enbas_sdt:40W06&as_vls=\"case:2739570581644DI4945asllh=0 Page 2 of 34 imp://scholar,google,corn/schoIaLcasezq=olsrrlmor+eolumblaw...ershl=encas_sdt=4oooossas_vls=lecase=2739570551s44ousosaullh=o Page 3 of 34 District of Columbia v. Heller, 12: 5. Cl. 273: 7 supreme Court 2005 7 Google Scholar 1119/14 11-3 AM exercised only through participation in some corporate body.151 Three provisions of the Constitution refer to \"the people'I in a context other than "rights'the famous preamble ("We the people"), 2 of Article | (providing that "the people'I will choose members of the House), and the Tenth Amendment (providing that those powers not given the Federal Government remain with "the States" or \"the people'). Those provisions arguably refer to "the people'I acting collectivelybut they deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights. Nowhere else in the Constitution does a "right'I attributed to "the people' refer to anything other than an individual rightJ-'jl What is more. in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention "the people," the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community. not '2791 an unspecied subset. As we said in mm v. VerdugoUrquidez 494 US. 259 265 110 S.Ct. 1056 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990): "[T]he people' seems to have been a term of art employed in select pans of the Constitution . . . . [Its uses] sugges[t] that 'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community." This contrasts markedly with the phrase "the militia'I in the prefatory clause. As we will describe below, the "militia" in colonial America consisted of a subset of "the people"those who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age range. Reading the Second Amendment as promoting only the right to "keep and bear Arms" in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the operative clause's description of the holder of that right as "the people." We start therefore with a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans. b. \"Keep and bear Arms." We move now from the holder of the right\"the people'to the substance of the right: \"to keep and bear Arms." Before addressing the verbs "keep'I and "bear," we interpret their object: "Arms.\" The 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined "arms" as "weapons of offence, or armour of defence." 1 Dictionary of the English Language 107 (4th ed.) (hereinafter Johnson). Timothy Cunningham's important 1771 legal dictionary dened "arms" as \"any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.\" 1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary (1771); see also N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989) (hereinafter Webster) (similar). The term was applied. then as now. to weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity. For insmnce, Cunningham's legal dictionary gave as an example of usage: "Servants and labourers shall use bows and arrows on Sundays, & c. and not bear other arms." See imp:I[scholarsoogIuom/schoIaLcaserq=dlsmmorunlumblawm erohl=enbas_sdx=400006&as_vls=ldcase=2739570581644DI4945dsllh=0 Page 4 of at District of Columbia v. Keller, 12: s. Ct, 2733 7 supreme Court 2005 7 Coogle Scholar 1119/14 11:34 AM also, 9.9., An Act for the trial of Negroes, 1797 Del. Laws ch. XLIII, 6, p. 104, in 1 First Laws of the State of Delaware 102, 104 (J. Cushing ed.1981 (pt. 1)): see generally ________________ _ (citing decisions of state courts constming "arms"). Although one founding-era thesaurus ll lted "arms" (as opposed to Weapons\") to \"instruments of offence generally made use of in war," even that source stated that all rearms constituted \"arms.\" 1 J. Trusler, The Distinction Between Words Esteemed Synonymous in the English Language 37 (1794) (emphasis added). Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications, e.g., WM 521 US. 844 849 117 S.Ct. 2329 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search. 6.9., W the Second Amendment extends, '2792 prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding. We turn to the phrases "keep arms\" and \"bear arms." Johnson dened \"keep\" as, most relevantty, "[t]o retain; not to lose," and "[t]o have in custody.\" Johnson 1095. Webster dened it as "[t]o hold; to retain in one's power or possession." No party has apprised us of an idiomatic meaning of "keep Arms." Thus. the most natural reading of "keep Arms" in the Second Amendment is to "have weapons." The phrase "keep arms" was not prevalent in the written documents of the founding period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing the right to "keep Arms\" as an individual right unconnected with militia service. Vllliam Blackstone, for example, wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties, one of which was that they were not permitted to "keep arms in their houses.\" 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 55 (1769) (hereinafter Blackstone); see also 1 W. & M., c. 15, 4, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 422 (1689) ("[N]o Papist . . . shall or may have or keep in his House . . . any Arms . . ."); 1 Hawkins, Treatise on the Pleas ofthe Crown 26 (1771) (similar). Petitioners point to militia laws of the founding period that required militia members to "keep" arms in connection with militia service, and they conclude from this that the phrase "keep Arms" has a militia- related connotation. See Brief for Petitioners 16-17 (citing laws of Delaware, New Jersey, and Virginia). This is rather like saying that, since there are many statutes that authorize aggrieved employees to 'le complaints" with federal agencies, the phrase "le complaints" has an employment-related connotation. "Keep arms" was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone elselll '2793 At the time of the founding, as now, to "bear" meant to "carry." See Johnson 161; Webster; T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1796); 2 Oxford English Dictionary 20 (2d ed.1989) (hereinafter Oxford). When used with "arms,\" however, the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular purposeconfrontation. In W W). in the course of analyzing the meaning of \"carries a rearm" in a federal criminal statute, Justice GINSBURG wrote that "[s]urely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution's Second Amendment . . . indicate[s]: 'wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offens'we or defensive action in a case of conict with another person!" Id., at 143, imp:/[scholangoogluom/schnlav_case?q=dlsulmor+olumblaw...erchl=encas_sdx=4oooossas_vls=mas:=2739570551s44oueosaullh=o Page 5 of 34 District of Columbia v. neller. 12: 5. Ct. 2733 , supreme Court. 2005 , Google Scholar 1/19/14 11-3: AM 118 S.Ct. 1911 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed.1998)). We think that Justice GINSBURG accurately captured the natural meaning of "bear arms." Although the phrase implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose of "offensive or defensive action." it in no way connotes participation in a structured military organization. From our review of founding-era sources, we conclude that this natural meaning was also the meaning that "bear arms" had in the 18th century. In numerous instances, "bear arms" was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an organized militia. The most prominent examples are those most relevant to the Second Amendment: Nine state constitutional provisions written in the 18th century or the rst two demdes of the 19th. which enshrined a right of citizens to "bear arms in defense of themselves and the state" or "bear arms in defense of himself and the state!\" It is clear from those formulations that "bear arms" did not refer only to carrying a weapon in an organized military unit. Justice James \\Mlson interpreted the Pennsylvania Constitution's anns-bearing right. for example. as a recognition of the natural right of defense "of one's person or house\"what he called the law of "self preservation." 2 Collected Works of James Wilson 1142. and n. x (K. Hall & M. Hall eds.2007) (citing Pa. Const, Art. IX, 21 (1790)); see also T. Walker. Introduction to American Law 198 (1837) \"2794 (\"Thus the right of self-defence [is] guaranteed by the [Ohio] constitution"); see also id., at 157 (equating Second Amendment with that provision of the Ohio Constitution). That was also the interpretation of those state constitutional provisions adopted by pre-Civil War state courts. [-9-] These provisions demonstrateagain, in the most analogous linguistic contextthat "bear arms\" was not limited to the carrying of arms in a militia. The phrase "bear Arms" also had at the time of the founding an idiomatic meaning that was signicantly different from its natural meaning: "to serve as a soldier, do military service. ght" or "to wage war." See Linguists' Brief 18; post, at 2827-2828 (STEVENS, J.. dissenting). But it unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition "against." which was in turn followed by the target of the hostilities. See 2 Oxford 21. (That is how. for example. our Declaration of Independence 1| 28. used the phrase: "He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country . . . .") Every example given by petitioners' amici for the idiomatic meaning of "bear arms" from the founding period either includes the preposition "against\" or is not clearly idiomatic. See Linguists' Brief 18-23. Without the preposition, "bear arms" normally meant (as it continues to mean today) what Justice GINSBURG'S opinion in Muscarello said. In any event, the meaning of "bear arms" that petitioners and Justice STEVENS propose is not even the (sometimes) idiomatic meaning. Rather, they manufacture a hybrid denition, whereby "bear arrns\" connotes the actual carrying of arms (and therefore is not really an idiom) but only in the service of an organized militia. No dictionary has ever adopted that denition. and we have been apprised of no source that indicates that it carried that meaning at the time of the founding. But it is easy to see why petitioners and the dissent are driven to the hybrid denition. Giving "bear Arms" its idiomatic meaning would cause the protected right to consist of the right to be a soldier or to wage waran absurdity that no commentator has ever endorsed. See L. Levy. Origins of the Bill of Rights 135 (1999). Worse still. the phrase "keep and bear Arms" would be incoherent. The word "Arms" would have two different meanings at once: "weapons" (as the object of 'keep") imp:I[scholareoogIuom/schoIaLcasm=dlsmmoucnlumblawm ershl=enw_sdx=4ooaossas_vls=locase:2739570sa1s44ousAscscllh=o Page 6 of 34 District of Columbia v. Keller. 125 541.2731 , supreme Court 2005 , Coogle Scholar 1/19/14 11:34 AM and (as the object of "bear\") one-half of an idiom. It would be rather like saying "He lled and kicked the bucket" to mean "He lled the bucket and died." Grotesque. Petitionersjustify their limitation of "bear arms" to the military context by pointing out the unremarkable fact that it was often used in that contextthe same mistake they made with respect to "keep arms." It is especially unremarkable that the phrase was often used in a military context in the federal legal sources (such as records of congressional debate) that have been the focus of petitioners' inquiry. Those sources would have had little occasion to use it except in discussions about the standing army and the militia. And the phrases used primarily in those military discussions include not only "bear arms" but also "carry arms," "possess arms," and "have anns"though no one "2795 thinks that those other phrases also had special military meanings. See Barnett. Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 Tex. L.Rev. 237, 261 (2004). The common references to these "t to bear arms" in congressional discussions about the militia are matched by use of the same phrase in the few nonmilitary federal contexts where the concept would be relevant. See, 9.51., 30 Journals of Continental Congress 349- 351 (J. Fitzpatrick ed.1934). Other legal sources frequently used "bear arms" in nonmilitary contexts.\" Cunningham's legal dictionary, cited above, gave as an example of its usage a sentence unrelated to military affairs ("Servants and labourers shall use bows and arrows on Sundays, & c. and not bear other arms"). And if one looks beyond legal sources. "bear arms" was frequently used in nonmilitary contexts. See Cramer & Olson, What Did "Bear Arms" Mean in the Second Amendment). 6 Georgetown J.L. & Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming Sept. 2008), online at http://papers.ssm.comlabstract= 1086176 (as visited June 24, 2008. and available in Clerk of Court's case le) (identifying numerous nonmilitary uses of "bear arms" from the founding period). Justice STEVENS points to a study by amici supposedly showing that the phrase "bear arms" was most frequentty used in the military context. See post, at 28282829, n. 9; Linguists' Brief 24. Of course. as we have said. the fact that the phrase was commonly used in a particular context does not show that it is limited to that context. and. in any event. we have given many sources where the phrase was used in nonmilitary contexts. Moreover, the study's collection appears to include (who knows how many times) the idiomatic phrase "bear arms against." which is irrelevant. The amici also dismiss examples such as "bear arms . . . for the purpose of killing game'" because those uses are "expressly qualied." Linguists' Brief 24. (Justice STEVENS uses the same excuse for dismissing the state constitutional provisions analogous to the Second Amendment that identify private~use purposes for which the individual right can be asserted. See post, at 2828.) That analysis is faulty. A purposive qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modies is unknown this side of the looking glass '2796 (except. apparently, in some courses on Linguistics). If "bear arms\" means. as we think. simply the carrying of arms. a modier can limit the purpose of the carriage ("for the purpose of self-defense\" or "to make war against the King"). But if "bear arms" means, as the petitioners and the dissent think. the carrying of arms only for military purposes, one simply cannot add "for the purpose of killing game." The right "to carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game" is worthy of the mad hatter. Thus. these purposive qualifying phrases positively establish that \"to bear arms\" is not limited to military useml imp:/[scholangoogruom/schnlar_case?q=dlsulmor+olumblaw...ershl=encas_sdx=4oooossas_vls=tecase=2739570551s44ousosaullh=o Page 7 of a4 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 - Supreme Court 2008 - Google Scholar 1/19/14 11:34 AM District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 - Supreme Court 2008 - Google Scholar 1/19/14 11:34 AM Justice STEVENS places great weight on James Madison's inclusion of a conscientious-objector clause in always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified his original draft of the Second Amendment: "but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be a pre-existing right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the compelled to render military service in person." Creating the Bill of Rights 12 (H. Veit, K. Bowling, & C. ight and declares only that it "shall not be infringed." As we said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542. Bickford eds. 1991) (hereinafter Veit). He argues that this clause establishes that the drafters of the Second $53, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876), "[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner Amendment intended "bear Arms" to refer only to military service. See post, at 2836. It is always perilous to 2798 dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The *2798 Second amendment declares that it shall not be derive the meaning of an adopted provision from another provision deleted in the drafting process. [121 In any infringed . . . ."Lid] case, what Justice STEVENS would conclude from the deleted provision does not follow. It was not meant to exempt from military service those who objected to going to war but had no scruples about personal Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, the Stuart Kings Charles II and James II succeeded in gunfights. Quakers opposed the use of arms not just for militia service, but for any violent purpose using select militias loyal to them to suppress political dissidents, in part by disarming their opponents. See J. whatsoever-so much so that Quaker frontiersmen were forbidden to use arms to defend their families, even Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms 31-53 (1994) (hereinafter Malcolm); L. Schwoerer, The Declaration of though "[ijn such circumstances the temptation to seize a hunting rifle or knife in self-defense . . . must Rights, 1689, p. 76 (1981). Under the auspices of the 1671 Game Act, for example, the Catholic James II had sometimes have been almost overwhelming." P. Brock, Pacifism in the United States 359 (1968); see M. ordered general disarmaments of regions home to his Protestant enemies. See Malcolm 103-106. These Hirst, The Quakers in Peace and War 336-339 (1923); 3 T. Clarkson, Portraiture of Quakerism 103-104 (3d experiences caused Englishmen to be extremely wary of concentrated military forces run by the state and to ed. 1807). The Pennsylvania Militia Act of 1757 exempted from service those "scruple the use of arms"-a be jealous of their arms. They accordingly obtained an assurance from William and Mary, in the Declaration phrase that no one contends had an idiomatic meaning. See 5 Stat. at Large of Pa. 613 (J. Mitchell & H. of Right (which was codified as the English Bill of Rights), that Protestants would never be disarmed: "That Flanders eds. 1898) (emphasis added). Thus, the most natural interpretation of Madison's deleted text is that the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as those opposed to carrying weapons for potential violent confrontation would not be "compelled to render allowed by law." 1 W. & M., c. 2, $ 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441 (1689). This right has long been understood military service," in which such carrying would be required. [13] to be the predecessor to our Second Amendment. See E. Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 51 (1957); W. Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 122 (1825) 2797 *2797 Finally, Justice STEVENS suggests that "keep and bear Arms" was some sort of term of art, hereinafter Rawle). It was clearly an individual right, having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia. presumably akin to "hue and cry" or "cease and desist." (This suggestion usefully evades the problem that To be sure, it was an individual right not available to the whole population, given that it was restricted to there is no evidence whatsoever to support a military reading of "keep arms.") Justice STEVENS believes Protestants, and like all written English rights it was held only against the Crown, not Parliament. See that the unitary meaning of "keep and bear Arms" is established by the Second Amendment's calling it a Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, in Bogus 207, 218; but see 3 J. Story, 'right" (singular) rather than "rights" (plural). See post, at 2830-2831. There is nothing to this. State Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States $ 1858 (1833) (hereinafter Story) (contending that the constitutions of the founding period routinely grouped multiple (related) guarantees under a singular "right," right to bear arms" is a "limitation] upon the power of parliament" as well). But it was secured to them as and the First Amendment protects the "right [singular] of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition individuals, according to "libertarian political principles," not as members of a fighting force. Schwoerer, the Government for a redress of grievances." See, e.g., Pa. Declaration of Rights SS IX, XII, XVI, in 5 Thorpe Declaration of Rights, at 283; see also id., at 78; G. Jellinek, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 3083-3084; Ohio Const., Arts. VIII, SS 11, 19 (1802), in id., at 2910-2911. 4 And even if "keep and bear Citizens 49, and n. 7 (1901) (reprinted 1979). Arms" were a unitary phrase, we find no evidence that it bore a military meaning. Although the phrase was By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects. See not at all common (which would be unusual for a term of art), we have found instances of its use with a Malcolm 122-134. Blackstone, whose works, we have said, "constituted the preeminent authority on English clearly nonmilitary connotation. In a 1780 debate in the House of Lords, for example, Lord Richmond law for the founding generation," Alden v. Maine. 527 U.S. 706, 715. 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 described an order to disarm private citizens (not militia members) as "a violation of the constitutional right of (1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen. See 1 Protestant subjects to keep and bear arms for their own defense." 49 The London Magazine or Gentleman's Blackstone 136, 139-140 (1765). His description of it cannot possibly be thought to tie it to militia or military Monthly Intelligencer 467 (1780). In response, another member of Parliament referred to "the right of bearing service. It was, he said, "the natural right of resistance and self-preservation," id., at 139, and "the right of arms for personal defence," making clear that no special military meaning for "keep and bear arms" was having and using arms for self-preservation and defence," id., at 140; see also 3 id., at 2-4 (1768). Other intended in the discussion. Id., at 467-468. [15] contemporary authorities concurred. See G. Sharp, Tracts, Concerning the Ancient and Only True Legal c. Meaning of the Operative Clause. Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they Means of National Defence, by a Free Militia 17-18, 27 (3d ed. 1782); 2 J. de Lolme, The Rise and Progress guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. This meaning is of the English Constitution 886-887 (1784) (A. Stephens ed. 1838); W. Blizard, Desultory Reflections on strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment. We look to this because it has Police 59-60 (1785). Thus, the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts' abuses was by the time of the 2799 founding understood to be an individual *2799 right protecting against both public and private violence. http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=district+ of+colu .+...er&hl=en&as_sdt=400006&as_vis=1&case=2739870581644084946&scilh=0 Page 8 of 84 http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=district+of+columbia+v.+...er&hl=en&as_sdt=400006&as_vis=1&case=2739870581644084946&scilh=0 Page 9 of 84Dlstrlu of Columbia v. Heller. 12: 5. Ct. 2733 , Supreme Court. 2005 , Google Scholar 1119/14 11-3 AM And. of course. what the Smarts had tried to do to their politiml enemies. George I\" had tried to do to the colonists. In the tumultuous decades of the 1760's and 1770's. the Crown began to disarm the inhabitarlts of the most rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms. A New York article of April 1769 said that '[i]t is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, conrmed by the Bill of Rights. to keep arms for their own defence.\" A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, New York Journal, Supp. 1, Apr. 13. 1769, in Boston Under Military Rule 79 (O. Dickerson ed.1936); see also. 9.9., Shippen, Boston Gazette, Jan. 30, 1769, in 1 The Writings of Samuel Adams 299 (H. Cushing ed.1968). They understood the right to enable individuals to defend themselves. As the most important early Amerimn edition of Blackstone's Commentaries (by the law professor and former Antifederalist St. George Tucker) made clear in the notes to the description of the arms right. Americans understood the "right of self-preservation" as permitting a citizen to "repe[l] force by force" when "the intervention of society in his behalf. may be too late to prevent an injury." 1 Blackstone's Commentaries 145- 146. n. 42 (1803) (hereinafter Tuckel's Blackstone). See also W. Duer, Outiines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence ofthe United States 31 -32 (1833). There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history. that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment's right of free speech was not, see, e.g., ni v. mm m . . 12 . . 1 LE .2 29%). Thus. we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for anypllrpose. Before turning to limitations upon the individual right. however. we must determine whether the prefatory clause ofthe Second Amendment comports with our interpretation of the operative clause. 2. Prefatory Clause. The prefatory clause reads: "A well regulated Militia. being necessary to the security of a free State. . . 3' a, \"Well-Regulated Militia." In W we explained that "the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.\" That denition campers with founding-era sources. See. e.g., Webster ("The militia of a country are the able bodied men organized into companies. regiments and brigades . . . and required by law to attend military exercises on certain days only. but at other times left to pursue their usual occupations"): The Federalist No. 46, pp. 329, 334 (B. Wright ed.1961) (J. Madison) ("near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands"); Letter to Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 520. 524 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) (\"[T]he militia ofthe State. that is to say, of every man in it able to bear arms"). Petitioners take a seemingly narrower view of the militia, stating that "[m]ilitias are the state- and congressionally-regulated military forces described in the Militia Clauses (art. I. 8. cls. 15-16).'I Brief for Petitioners 12. Although we agree with petitioners' interpretive assumption that "militia" means the same thing in Article | '2500 and the Second Amendment. we believe that petitioners identify the wrong thing, namely, the organized militia. Unlike armies and navies. which Congress is given the power to create ("to raise . . . http:IlscholarooogIuom/scholar_case?q=dlsrrlmot+nlumbiaw.. .crtlhI:cnus_sdt=lool)06&as_vis=\"teased 7395705116440a4946cs