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Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity q1 . Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 1's choice, and then proceed to simultaneously choose 92 and 93 , respectively. Market demand is given by p(Q) = 100 - Q, and Q = q1 + q2 + 93 . Firm 1's costs are c1(q1) = 4q1, firm 2's costs are c2(92) = 2q2 and firm 3's costs are C3(93) = 293. Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of q1 and 93 , and you can similarly express Firm 3's best response function in terms of q1 and q2 . Using these, answer the following questions. a) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses q1 = 3, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses q1 = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? c) (1 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity? d) (0.5 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity