Please reply to the inquiry by the reference with an understanding

Issue: What overarching issue was the court addressing or resolving (one questions not a paragraph just one sentence encapsulating)

Facts: What are the facts that the court described and cared about?

facts section should only include the actual facts of the case.

Rule of Law:What rule please mention the statue, case, legal principle mention did the court apply

*rule of law segment should only constitutional amendments or cases the Court applies the facts USE PRECEDENT

Application- how did the court apply the rule to the facts?

*application section should be how the Court applied the facts to the law

Conclusion: what result did the court reach and WHY?

Schreiber v. California

. Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communica- tion by the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis. Petitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participa- tion, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemi- cal analysis and on that alone. Since the blood test evidence, although an incrimi nating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.pelled him to submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might be used to prosecute him for a criminal offense. He submitted only after the police officer rejected his object tion and directed the physician to proceed. The officer's direction to the physician to administer the test over petitioner's objection constituted compulsion for the purposes of the privilege. The critical question, then, is whether petitioner was thus compelled "to be a witness against himself." It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communica- tions, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers. On the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprint- ing. photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in differ- ent ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications' or "testimony." but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of *real or physical evidence" does not violate it.testing procedures plainly constitute searches of "persons," and depend antecedently upon seizures of "persons," within the meaning of that Amendment.While carly cases suggest that there is an unrestricted "right on the part of the govern- ment always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime," the mere fact of a lawful arrest does not end our inquiry. The suggestion of these casesSCHMERBER V. CALIFORNIA 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) [Police arrested Schmerber at the scene of an automobile accident for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). While he was at a hospital being treated for injuries sustained in the accident, one of the officers instructed a physician to withdraw a blood sample. Schmerber refused to consent, but a sample was taken anyway. The sample revealed a blood alcohol content in excess of the state's maximum for DUI. Schmerber moved to suppress the test results on sev- cral grounds, including that withdrawal of his blood and admission of the test results into evidence violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incriminating and his Fourth Amendment right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures. Schmerber's motion to suppress was denied and he was convicted.] MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. The Privilege Against Self-IncriminatingClaim It could not be denied that in requiring petitioner to submit to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of his blood the State com-The Search and Seizure Claim In Breithaupt, as here, it was also con- tended that the chemical analysis should be excluded from evidence as the product of an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court did not decide whether the extrac- tion of blood in that case was unlawful, but rejected the claim on the basis of Wolf v. People of State of Colorado. That case had held that the Constitution did not require, in state prosecutions for state crimes, the exclus sion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's provisions. We have since overruled Wolf in that respect, holding in Mapp v. Ohio that the exclusionary rule adopted for federal prosecutions in Weeks V. United States must also be applied in crimi- nal prosecutions in state courts. The question is squarely presented therefore, whether the chemical analysis introduced in evidence in this case should have been excluded as the product of an unconstitutional search and scizure- The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State. In Wolf we recognized "(the secu- rity of one's privacy against arbitrary intru- sion by the police" as being "at the core of the Fourth Amendment" and "basic to a free society." We reaffirmed that broad view of the Amendment's purpose in applying the federal exclusionary rule to the States in Mapp. . . . But if compulsory administra- tion of a blood test does not implicate the Fifth Amendment, it plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment expressly provides that "(1) he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." (Emphasis added.) It could not reasonably be argued, and indeed respons dent does not argue, that the administration of the blood test in this case was free of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Such testing procedures plainly constitute searchesmere fact of a lawful arrest does not end our inquiry. The suggestion of these cases apparently rests on two factors - first, there may be more immediate danger of concealed weapons or of destruction of evidence under the direct control of the accused; second, once a search of the arrested person for weapons is permitted, it would be both impractical and unnecessary to enforcement of the Fourth Amendment's purpose to attempt to confine the search to those objects alone. Whatever the validity of these considerations in general, they have little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface. The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search. Although the facts which established probable cause to arrest in this case also suggested the required relevance and likely success of a test of petitioner's blood for alcohol, the question remains whether the arresting officer was permitted to draw these inferences himself, or was required instead to procure a warrant before proceeding with the test. Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained is a requirement that inferences to support the search "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14. See also Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-111. The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human body rather than with state inter- ferences with property relationships or private papers-"houses, papers, and effects"-we write on a clean slate. Limitations on the kinds of property which may be seized under warrant, as distinct from the procedures for search and the permissible scope of search, are not instructive in this context. We begin with the assumption that once the privilege against self-incriminatings been found not to bar compelled intrusions into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content, the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justi- fied in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. In other words, the questions we must decide in this case are whether the police were justified in requir- ing petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. In this case, as will often be true when charges of driving under the influence of alco- hol are pressed, these questions arise in the context of an arrest made by an officer with- out a warrant. Here, there was plainly prob- able cause for the officer to arrest petitioner and charge him with driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The police officer who arrived at the scene shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner's breath, and testified that peti- tioner's eyes were "bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance." The officer saw petitioner again at the hospital, within two hours of the accident. There he noticed simi- lar symptoms of drunkenness. He thereupon informed petitioner "that he was under arrest and that he was entitled to the services of an attorney, and that he could remain silent, and that anything that he told me would be used against him in evidence." While early cases suggest that there is an unrestricted "right on the part of the govern- ment always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover