plz pls plic

uestion:

Indicate your source or reference for each of the responses for the 9 questions. Indicate if more than one source was utilized for each question with multi-part responses. 1) Explain the difference in philosophy on risk between Medicare and Managed Care. Indicate if they are risk adversewhy or why not.

2) Which of the payers have deductibles in their plans?

3) How is medical necessity checking handled with Medicare?

4) How the prior approval process is managed for Commercial and Managed Care plans?

5) Which of the payers require Premiums from their members for inpatient services?

6) What is the relationships of Medicare Advantage Plans with Commercial and Managed Care Plans?

7) Which plans allow for individual enrollment? Family enrollment? Or both?

8) How does Managed Care manage the selection of providers?

Medicare?

Commercial payers?

9) Identify based on your review which type of plan would BEST meet your needs as a patient and why.

1. Find an example that illustrates how either a specific service or product incorporates "fail-safing" or a "poka-yoke". Explain how this service or product design helps to prevent mistakes from occurring, i.e. facilitates "doing the job right the first time." Note: Reliability and durability of a product is NOT the same as "mistake proofing".

2. Find a second example that illustrates the LACK of fail-safing or mistake proofing. You might encounter a service or a product that because of the process or product design, errors are likely to occur. What is the problem (provide adequate description to allow classmates to respond to your post) and what could the company do to minimize mistakes by either changing the process in a service or in the product design for a product? NOTE: Poor design that results in overall poor product performance is NOT the same as a lack of a fail-safing device

Trade tensions between China and the United States At a World Economic Forum meeting in Switzerland in 2017, the Chinese President re-affirmed his country's commitment to free trade and pledged never to start a protectionist trade war' or to benefit from a devaluation of its currency, the yuan. Meanwhile, the United States (US) President stated that the 'America First' doctrine means increased protectionism and he repeatedly threatened to impose tariffs and import quotas on Chinese goods. During 2016, the value of the US dollar rose against most currencies. In contrast, the Chinese yuan weakened significantly from 6.20 yuan per US dollar at the end of 2014 to 6.95 yuan at the end of 2016. The US President has accused China of intentionally devaluing the yuan in order to boost China's export competitiveness. Despite strong downward pressure on its currency, China has attempted to keep the yuan-US dollar exchange rate relatively stable, costing more than US$2 trillion of its official foreign exchange reserves. China has stated that it does not want the yuan to fall in value any more than the US does, but no country has complete control over its exchange rate. China, like Japan and Germany, usually has a current account surplus on the balance of payments, but China's current account surplus as a percentage of GDP fell in 2016 and the International Monetary Fund expects it to decrease further, as exports continue to fall. There are three policy paths that a country can follow with regard to its exchange rate: a completely free float, a managed float or a fixed (pegged) exchange rate. Each of these has various advantages and disadvantages. At present, China's policy is a managed float, but some economists have argued that it is the yuan-US dollar exchange rate that is regarded as being especially important and so it might be better if China decided to fix (peg) the yuan to the dollar. Fig. 1.1 shows the yuan-US dollar exchange rate over three years.1. Consider the following game W T Z 3.2 0,0 0.0 1,1 0.0 2.3 1,1 0.0 0.0 0,0 -1,-1 1,1 1,1 -1,-1 0,0 (a) Compute the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Compute the set of correlated equilibrium distributions. (c) Identify a correlated equilibrium that is not a Nash equilibrium. 2. This question asks you to establish the formal link between correlated equilibrium and Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Assuming everything is finite, consider a game G = (N, S. u) . (a) For any given (common-prior) information structure (1, I, p), find a type space (T, p') where the types do not affect the the payoffs in G and a one-to-one mapping Ti between the information cells I, (w) and types , (1, (w)) E T. (for all i e N), such that an adapted strategy profile s = ($1, ...; S,) w.r.t. (0, I, p) is a correlated equilibrium if and only if sor- is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (G, T, p'). [Here, soT-1 = (SIOT] , . ..; $1071) is such that, for every type ti, s,or; (1;) = s; (w) for some w with 7, (I, (w)) = ti-] (b) For any type space (T, p') where the types do not affect the the payoffs in G, find a information structure (2, I, p) and a one-to-one mapping w : 7 - ? such that S = ($1, ..., Sn) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (G, T. p') if and only if sour-1 is a correlated equilibrium. 3. For any given game G = (N, S, u), a set Z = Z1 x . .. x Z. C S is said to be closed under rational behavior if for every i e N, & E Z;, there exists u E A (Z_,) such that Z E arg max,, u; (si, f). (a) Show that if Z is closed under rational behavior, then Z C S. (b) Show that for any family of sets Z" that are closed under rational behavior, the set Z = (U.Z;) x . . . x (U.Zi) is closed under rational behavior. Conclude that the largest set Z' that is closed under rational behavior exists. (c) Show that Z* = 5x