Policy A: Regulation - an allowable bycatch standard (number of sea lions) for each fisher. If a fisher violates the bycatch standard (i.e., ends up catching more sea lions than the standard allows) at the end of the fishing season, he has to pay a lump sum fine.

Policy B: An early seasonal closure so that fishers have a shorter time span to go fishing.

Let us assume the Australian government has a perfect monitoring system to see how many sea lions are being caught.

If Policy A is implemented, each fisher can either meet the standard by adjusting his fishing behavior. Or, he can pay the fine and harvest as much as he wants to maximize his profits without worrying about the sea lion bycatch. If the fisher meets the standard, his profit is $9000 and the Australian government benefit is worth $1200 (think of it as a benefit (in dollar terms) to society from reduced sea lion bycatch). If the fisher chooses to pay the fine, the fisher's profit is $7500 and the government's benefit is worth $500 (no benefit from reduced sea lions but say the government can use $500 for conservation efforts to protect sea lions).

If Policy B is implemented, the fisher can respond in two alternative ways - (i) increase fishing effort per day during the shorter fishing and harvest very intensively (this behavior is known as the "race to fish" behavior) or (ii) continue to fish the same way (i.e., unchanged fishing effort). If the fisher decides to race to fish, his profit is $6000 and the Australian government's benefit is $600. If the fisher continues to fish the same way as in the past, his profit is $4500 and the Australian government's benefit is worth $850.

What are the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) strategies for the Australian government and the fisher?

Group of answer choices

Australian government will choose policy A. If the government chooses policy A, the fisher will choose to pay the fine. If the government chooses policy B, the fisher will choose to race to fish.

Australian government will choose policy B. If the government chooses policy A, the fisher will choose to meet the standard. If the government chooses policy B, the fisher will choose to race to fish

Australian government will choose policy A If the government chooses policy A, the fisher will choose to meet the standard. If the government chooses policy B, the fisher will choose to race the fish.

Australian government will choose policy B. If the government chooses policy A, the fisher will choose to pay the fine. If the government chooses policy B, the fish choose continue fishing the same way (unadjusted fishing behavior).

What will the subgame perfect NE outcome?

Group of answer choices

The Australian government will receive 500 and the fisher will make 7500.

The Australian government will receive 1200 and the fisher will make 9000.

The Australian government will receive 600 and the fisher will make 6000.

The Australian government will receive 850 and the fisher will make 4500.

Job market signals like dressing well for interviews are not especially effective because:

Group of answer choices

the cost of dressing well is about the same for high-quality and low-quality workers.

many businesses have adopted casual office attire, so dressing well is not important to the firm.

federal labor laws prohibit firms from using dress or appearance as an employment criterion.

none of the above.

Assume that a firm spends $500 on two inputs, labor (graphed on the horizontal axis) and capital (graphed on the vertical axis). If the wage rate is $20 per hour and the rental cost of capital is $25 per hour, the slope of the isocost curve will be

Group of answer choices

500.

25/500.

-4/5.

25/20 or 1.25.

The change in the quantity demanded of a good resulting from a change in relative price with the level of satisfaction held constant is called the ________ effect.

Group of answer choices

Giffen

real price

income

substitution