Prepare solutions for the different hypothetical market structure scenarios in Table 2 using the information below. Demand: p = 550 - 50YT, YT = y1 + 12 Firm 1 Cost Function: C, = 50y, Firm 2 Cost Function: C2 = 50y2 Bertrand's Price Monopoly by Cournot Stackelberg Competition Firm 1 Cartel Simultaneous Leader/Follower quantity decisions quantity dec. V1 (i a) (ii a) (iii a) (iv a) (v a) (i b) (ii b) (iii b) (iv b) (v b) Total YT (i_c) (ii_c) (iii_c) (iv c) (v c) P (i_d) (ii_d) (iii_d) (iv_d) (v d) 1 1 (i_e) (ii_e) (iii_e) (iv_e) (v e) (i f) (ii f) (iii f) (iv_f) (v_f) Total IT (i h) (ii h) (ii h) (iv h) (v h) (1) DWL (i i) (ii_i) (ii i) (iv i) (v_i) (2) CS (ij) (ii_j) (iii_j) (iv_j) (v_j) (3) PS (i k) (ii k) (iii k) (iv_k) (v k ) Total (1)+(2)+(3) (i_1) (ii_[) (ii_1) (iv_1) Notes: In the Bertrand's scenario and the Cartel scenario, assume that each firm supplies 50% of the market. Firm 1 is the leader in the Stackelberg scenario. Use two decimal places to express the amounts of output and perform all calculations