Problem 5. You are the owner of a bar called "EERCland." You sell mi- croeconomic problems. To you, the marginal cost of developing a problem is $3 (MC = $3). There are two types of customers: smart ones (SO) and very smart ones (VSO). Customers of both types enjoy solving problems. However, very smart guys like it more. So the demand functions are as follows: Q 24 - P (for VSOs) Q2 3P (for SOs) You want to use a linear two-part tariff to charge customers: they pay a fixed fee A for the right to enter the bar and a uniform price P for each problem bought from you. 1) Suppose you can tell the customers apart (you know who is very smart and who is smart). What is the maximal total profits you can get? 2) Suppose you can not tell the customers apart. What is the optimal tariff? 4 24 - Problem 5. You are the owner of a bar called "EERCland." You sell mi- croeconomic problems. To you, the marginal cost of developing a problem is $3 (MC = $3). There are two types of customers: smart ones (SO) and very smart ones (VSO). Customers of both types enjoy solving problems. However, very smart guys like it more. So the demand functions are as follows: Q 24 - P (for VSOs) Q2 3P (for SOs) You want to use a linear two-part tariff to charge customers: they pay a fixed fee A for the right to enter the bar and a uniform price P for each problem bought from you. 1) Suppose you can tell the customers apart (you know who is very smart and who is smart). What is the maximal total profits you can get? 2) Suppose you can not tell the customers apart. What is the optimal tariff? 4 24