Q1. Consider the following game: D E A 1,2 4,1 2,3 2,6 C 3,0 1,3 Find all MSNE. Q2. Consider the fo lowing game: Left Right Up 5,5 2,4 Down 5,7 3,7 Find all NE in pure strategies. Which ones of them are tremaling-hand perfect? Q3. Consider the volunteer's dilemma from the lab, where n players participate in the game. Each player decides whether to invest into a public good. If at least one player invested, then everyone receives $1 from the public good, but each player who invested has to pay the cost of $0.20. If no one invested, then everyone gets $0.20. Find a MSNE in symmetric strategies, i.e., assume that all players choose to invest with the same probability p. Find that p as a function of the number of players n