Q1 Market-clearing Prices Consider a stande position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). Position T receives 355v = 150 clicks per day and position B receives 2:3 = 50 clicks per day. There are four bidders (Bl-B4) with the following dollar values per click: v1 = 8,112 = 6,113 = 4,1:4 = 2. (a) Find the efficient assignment. (b) Find the lowest per click market-clearing prices. (c) Find the highest per click market-clearing prices. (d) Fully specify and draw the complete set of ALL per click marketclearing prices. Q2 GSP vs. Vickrey Consider a standard position auction. There are three positions: Top (T), Middle (M) and Bottom (B). Position T receives 3T = 150 clicks per day, position M receives mM = 100 and position B receives :33 = 50 clicks per day. There are ve bidders (Bl-B5) with the following dollar values per click: in = 12% = 10,03 = 7,134 = 5,05 = 3. (3.) Verify whether bidding your value will be an equilibrium of the GSP auction (Google). (b) Find an equilibrium of the GSP auction (Google) with the maximum revenue. (c) Find an equilibrium of the GSP auction (Google) with the minimum revenue. (d) Find the equilibrium of the Vickrey auction (Facebook). Calculate auction revenue. Q3 Playing Detective Consider a stande position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). Posi tion T receives my = 200 clicks per day and position B receives :1: 3 = 100 clicks per day. There are three bidders (B1 - B3) with the dollar values per click that satisfy '01 > w > '03 > 0. All values are positive integers. In this question you will recover values 1,11,02,03 step-bystep by following the list of clues. The list of clues (proceed in the given order)