eBay.com is a website that hosts online auctions. The standard auction format on eBay.com is the ascending bid auction. Suppose that some seller is using eBay.com to auction their mint- condition copy of the vinyl record Abbey Road by The Beatles. Also, suppose that the seller wasn't careful when they created the listing and they mistakenly titled their listing as "Abby's Road by The Beetels Vinyl MINT." Q1.1 1 Point What effect do you think the spelling errors will have on the number of buyers that are able to find the auction using eBay.com's search tools? Enter your answer here Save Answer Q1.2 2 Points How do you think the error will ultimately affect the seller's revenue? Why? Q2 Revenue equivalence I 5 Points Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the seller draws one of the N bids at random. The buyer whose bid was drawn wins the auction and pays the amount bid. Assume that buyer valuations follow a uniform(0,1) distribution. Q2.1 2 Points What is the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy b(v)? Explain in words why you know this. Enter your answer here Save Answer Q2.2 1 Point What is the seller's expected revenue? Enter your answer here Save Answer Q2.3 2 Points Why doesn't this auction pay the seller the same revenue as the four standard auctions? That is, why doesn't the revenue equivalence theorem apply here? Be specific. Enter your answer here Q3 Revenue equivalence II 3 Points Consider an all-pay, sealed-bid auction where the item goes to the highest bidder and all of the buyers pay what they bid. Assume that buyer valuations follow a uniform(0,1) distribution. Use the revenue equivalence theorem to find the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy b(v). Submit an image file showing the bidding function b(v) and your work in deriving it. E Please select file(s) Select file(s) Save Answer Q4 Revenue equivalence III 3 Points Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the highest-bidder wins and pays the amount that they bid and the lowest bidder receives a payment equal to the difference between the first- and second-highest bids. Does this auction pay the seller the same revenue as the four standard auctions? (That is, does the revenue equivalence theorem apply here?) Why or why not? Be specific. Enter your answer here