Question 1

Demand for good Q is given to be Q = 50 - P, where P is price. Two firms both produce good Q, A and B. Each firm can either produce 11 units or 15 units. Assume both firms have zero cost. If A produces 11 units and B produces 15 units, then A's revenue is _____ and B's revenue is _____.

Group of answer choices

$264; $333

$264; $360

$270; $333

$270; $360

Flag question: Question 2

Question 2

Consider firms A and B again from the previous question, where each firm picks either 11 or 15 units. If firm B produces 15 units, then A's best response is to produce ______ units, in which case A earns revenue _____.

Group of answer choices

11; $264

11; $270

15; $288

15; $300

Flag question: Question 3

Question 3

Firms AA & BB each produce the same type of good, Q. Demand for Q is Q = 150 - P, where P is the price of Q. Both firms have a total cost function of 20Q. If the firms successfully collude, to generate a monopoly like outcome, what level of Q should each firm produce?

Group of answer choices

27

30.5

32.5

34

Flag question: Question 4

Question 4

Consider the two firms, AA and BB from the previous question again. If firm AA produces the "colluding" output you solved for in the previous problem, but firm BB finds a way to cheat and produce whatever it wants, then firm BB will produce a Q of ____ units .

Group of answer choices

48.75

50.50

52.55

55.25

Flag question: Question 5

Question 5

Firm B and C each produce good X, and demand is X = 260 - 0.5P, where P is the price. Let firm B have total cost 12 + 16XB and C has total cost of 10XC. In this case, firm B's reaction function is

Group of answer choices

XB = 62 - 2XC

XB = 65 - 2XC

XB = 126 - 0.5XC

XB = 132 - 0.5XC