Question 14 0.5 pts Consider a two-firm Cournot model of competition where each firm i has a continuous profit function m (q) for q 2 0. The number of pure strategies for each firm is finite Question 15 1 pts (Continue) Without knowing the expression of profit function, we can say that O There must be at least one Nash equilibrium. O There must be a unique Nash equilibrium. O There can be multiple Nash equilibrium. O Nash equilibrium may not exist. O None of above.Question 16 1 pts In a Cournot model of competition with two firms, suppose that each firm can choose only q = 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4. Without knowing the expression of profit function, we can say that There must be at least one Nash equilibrium. There must be a unique Nash equilibrium. O There can be multiple Nash equilibrium. O Nash equilibrium may not exist. O None of above.Question 11 0.5 pts If same player is playing a weakly dominated strategy, then it cannot be a Nash equilibrium. 0 True (0 False Question 12 0.5 pts In a pure or mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. players never assign positive probability to strictly dominated strategies. Q) True 0 False