Question 2 Consider the following extensive form game which incorporates the role of chance. In this model, a politician and media reporter are strategically interacting. The politician moves first and must decide whether to communicate a story to the media truthfully, or embellish its content to make themselves look better. Upon receiving the story, the media knows whether it has been truthfully communicated or embellished, but has to either break the story as is or conduct a costly fact checking background to gather further information. If they choose to fact check the story and source it carefully rather than break it themselves immediately, they run the risk of the story leaking and being published by another news outlet. Assume this occurs with probability p(0,1). If the story is leaked, the game ends. However, if the story is not leaked, the media outlet can then decide, having conducted their fact checking, whether to publish the story or not. The sequence of events and payoffs are given in the following game tree. (a) Identify all SPNE of the game, clearly stating the strategies of each player at each decision node as well as the conditions on the probability term p for which each strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. Question 2 Consider the following extensive form game which incorporates the role of chance. In this model, a politician and media reporter are strategically interacting. The politician moves first and must decide whether to communicate a story to the media truthfully, or embellish its content to make themselves look better. Upon receiving the story, the media knows whether it has been truthfully communicated or embellished, but has to either break the story as is or conduct a costly fact checking background to gather further information. If they choose to fact check the story and source it carefully rather than break it themselves immediately, they run the risk of the story leaking and being published by another news outlet. Assume this occurs with probability p(0,1). If the story is leaked, the game ends. However, if the story is not leaked, the media outlet can then decide, having conducted their fact checking, whether to publish the story or not. The sequence of events and payoffs are given in the following game tree. (a) Identify all SPNE of the game, clearly stating the strategies of each player at each decision node as well as the conditions on the probability term p for which each strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium