QUESTION 4 {25 POINT S! Consider the following payoff matrix, where the payoffs are prots in thousand $. Explanation of payoff: If Player 1 chooses Strategy A and player 2 chooses Strategy B then Player 1 gets $150,000 and Player 2 gets $140,000 Player 2 A B C 270, 250 150, 140 295, 150 Player 1 260, 220 300,240 200, 145 240, 225 120, 130 290, 230 1. Find the Nash equilibrium if the players make the decisions simultaneously. 2. Do either player have a dominant strategy? Is this a prisoner's dilemma problem? Please explain. 3. Find the outcome if both players are risk averse and choose a maxi-min strategy. 4. Now consider the game as sequential. How much would player I invest to be the first mover? 5. Is there any potential for side payments? If so, who will pay and how much? Explain clearly. QUESTION 5 20 POINTS! Market research has identified three different types of consumers based on survey data. The following schedule gives the reservation prices of these customers for the two most popular products you sell. Assume that there is one customer per " Customer Type ". Customer Type Product 1 Product 2 1 $80 $ 120 2 25 185 3 100 100 The marginal cost is 40 per product. Compare the profits from pure bundling, mixed bundling, and selling the products separately. Note that price discrimination is not possible. Which of the strategies would you choose to maximize prots? Show all calculations and explain your answer. Point out how would determine the values of discounts or dummy prices when discussing mixed bundling