Question 6 3 pts Suppose Players 1 and 2 are participating in a first-price sealed bid auction with private, independent valuations. Each player's valuation of the object to be sold, which is assumed to be worth D t the seller, is either [i or 2with equal probabilities. Each player knows her own valuation but only the probability distribution on the other player's valuation. Bids are restricted to be either 0, 1, or 2. Remember bids are chosen simultaneously, the highest bidder wins and pays the amount of her bid. If two bidders bid the same amount, one of them gets the object with probability [1.5 and only that bidder who gets the object must pay. a} 1What is a strategy for a player in this game? b}A bidder decides in advance of knowing his value to bid 0 if his value turns out to be 0 and 1 if his value turns out to be 2. If both bidders decide to behave in this fa shion, would their strategies constitute a NE? Explain your