QUESTION 6 - John Brown, a retired widower, said to Mrs. Adele Barber that if he could find a suitable house and if she would move into it as a housekeeper, help operate it as a rooming house, and take care of him, he would give her the house on his death. Mrs. Barber agreed. Mr. Brown purchased a house that he operated as a rooming house until his death five years later. During this period Mrs. Barber served as housekeeper; she prepared the necessary food and made other household purchases, always turning over to Mr. Brown the balance of the board money received from the tenants. She received no remuneration for her services other than her own board and an occasional allowance for clothing.

Mr. Brown made no provision in his will for Mrs. Barber, and following his death Mrs. Barber brought an action against the executors of his estate for specific performance of his promise. In evidence, Mrs. Barber offered the testimony of her two daughters, her son, and her son-in-law, who were present at the time of the original conversation between her and Mr. Brown. The executor contested the action. What legal considerations are relevant to a decision in this case? State whether Mrs. Barber's action would succeed.

QUESTION 7 - Twilight Properties agreed to purchase land on the Vancouver waterfront from the Harbour Commission, conditional upon no changes being made to the zoning bylaw that permitted high-density development for building condominium units. Twilight then began negotiations with the city for a site plan for 650 units. Its chief executive officer, Moon, was very optimistic and immediately offered 500 units for sale. (He had a fallback plan to build only that number if the zoning and site plans were restricted by municipal authority.) Moon obtained agreements to purchase 110 units from individual purchasers, who paid deposits to Twilight of $20 000 per unit. Each contract contained a clause stating

if the development does not proceed in accordance with Twilight Properties' plans, Twilight retains the right to terminate the contract without liability on or before June 30, 2015.

This date corresponded with the closing date in the agreement with the Harbour Commission. Units were to be available, and the deals closed one year later.

On June 30, 2015, Twilight completed the purchase of the lands, but the date passed without any approval of the site plan by the city. At the end of July, the Planning and Development Department of the city approved the site plan and sent it on to the city council. However, in October the city council refused to approve the plan and stated that it intended to reduce the number of units permitted on the property. The council instructed its secretary to write to Twilight and ask whether it would be willing to provide a guarantee to the original condominium purchasers that it would perform its commitments to sell the units should the development be approved. Twilight replied that the city's request was inappropriate and an interference with its private contract rights. At its November meeting, the city passed a more restrictive rezoning bylaw that would permit only 400 units to be built.

Immediately afterward, Twilight returned the deposits of the purchasers and stated that their agreements were terminated; it was not possible to proceed with the project as planned. The unit purchasers sued for breach of contract. Twilight defended by claiming that their contracts were frustrated by the actions of the city. Summarize the arguments for each side, and give your opinion about who should succeed.

QUESTION 8 - Gabrieli bought a truck from a dealer, Transit Inc. Gabrieli signed a "purchase order" on May 12, at which time Transit ordered the truck from the manufacturer. It was agreed that the sale was subject to Gabrieli's being able to arrange suitable financing.

Three weeks later, Gabrieli informed Transit that she had been able to obtain a loan from her bank and was in a position to give Transit a bank draft for the full price. Transit confirmed that the arrangement was satisfactory. On August 2, the truck was delivered to Transit from the manufacturer. Transit called Gabrieli, telling her, "Your truck is here and ready for you to collect." Gabrieli went straight to the Transit premises, handed over the bank draft, and received the keys, papers, and truck. At that time, Transit's sales manager also handed her a number of other documents, including one the manager described as "your warranty," which he asked Gabrieli to sign. Gabrieli did so. The document gave a limited one-year warranty for defects but excluded implied warranties and excluded liability for consequential damages.

The truck proved to be defective and soon developed a number of faults. Gabrieli took the truck back to Transit on numerous occasions for various repairs, but these were mostly unsuccessful. Finally, after more than two years of unsatisfactory operation, Gabrieli returned the truck to Transit and demanded her money back.

Transit denied liability, pointing to the one-year warranty that excluded the statutory implied warranties.

Is Gabrieli entitled to any remedy? Why or why not?

ANSWER - For the following case Gabrieli was a customer who bought a truck for his personal use from a dealer, Transit Inc. as he signed a purchase order as he went there they told him about the warranty as it included numerous offers as this warranty as for a year for that does not include implied warranties as well as this it also not include liability for consequential damage

QUESTION 9 - Firth contracted with Dave the Mover Inc. to have her furniture and household effects moved from her house, stored for a week (until she moved into her new home), and then delivered to the new home. Firth told Dave's manager that she was particularly concerned about security, since the effects included some rare and valuable antiques and artifacts. She was told there was nothing to worry about. The articles would remain in the trailer until delivery at her new home, and the trailer would be locked at all times and parked in their yard, which was securely fenced, locked at night, and kept under regular supervision.

The trailer was kept in the yard as promised for several days, but one night, after a heavy snowfall, it was moved and parked, unattended, on a public street while the yard was being plowed. While it was parked on the street, the trailer was stolen.

Firth claimed damages for the full value of the goods lost. Dave's admitted liability but pointed out that the bill of lading limited damages to $0.60 per pound weight of the goods, which came to just over $7000, a small fraction of their true value.

Firth admitted she was aware of the limitation when she entered into the contract but claimed she only agreed to it because of the assurance that the trailer would be properly supervised at all times.

Should Dave's be allowed to rely on the limitation clause?