Question and information in pictures.

Use the following extensive-form game to answer the questions below. (so. [20) n X (50. 50) 9 Y (0.0) 2 (100, 150) a. For Player 1, which of the following are feasible strategies? For Player 2, which of the following are feasible strategies? Yif A, Z if B Wif A, X if B WifA, Yif B X if A, Z if B O Xb. Which of the following is/are the Nash equilibria to this game? Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B. Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B. Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B. Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B. . . . .. . . . :. . . . .. Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Z if B