Question Attached

3. Suppose that you own a Zone 3 [laser tag and games} in Hobart. Eonsider the following data for three types of consumers. Type A MB l5 per unit] 24.11\") l 12.01} EJII [1 Type E Type C Sales MB Sales MEI Sales [u nits a [5 per [u nits a . {movies} month} it Hit} month} [Sfmmel month] 1 2&0!) 1 15.00 1 2 14.' 2 100 2 3 E 3 5J3!) 3 4 2 .III 4 mm 4 5 D 5 5 Suppose you only sell to these 3 customertypes. 't'our xed costs are Ell]I and your marginal cost is 54, so that total cost is TC = at}, where [1 represents your output. Suppose that you are restricted to setting a single price which all customers pay. What is the single price you would set to maximise your prots. What pricing scheme would yield you the highest profits if you oould identify each custDmErS' marginal benefit? What are the prices and profits? Suppose it is possible for the firm to restrict access to those who pay an access fee. What is the prot maximising twospart tariff if you cannot identify customer's by their marginal benet, but can tell whether they haye paid the aocess fee? (In this case the rm can only distinguish between those who have a have not paid an access fee.)