Questions 18-22: Suppose there are two firms in the market. Consider the following inverse market demand function: P = 34 - (Q1 + Q2) The cost function for each firm in this market is identical, and given by Ci(Qi) = 4Qi Under these conditions, analyze different oligopoly outputs, prices and profits. Please answer the following questions. 18) Under Cournot duopoly, what is each firm's optimal output? A) 5 B) 7.5 C) 10 D) 15 E) 20 19) Under Cournot duopoly, what is the market price? A) 4 B) 10 C) 11.5 D) 14 E) 19 20) Under Stackelberg duopoly, what is the follower's optimal output? A) 5 B) 7.5 C) 10 D) 15 E) 20 21) If companies agree to set the output (Collusion case), what is the market price? A) 4 B) 10 C) 11.5 D) 14 E) 19 22) If companies start a price war (Bertrand Duopoly), what is the market price? A) 4 B) 10 C) 11.5 D) 14 E) 19