Read the following case and listed laws/doctrines carefully and make an argument with the IRAC method.

Instructions:

1. You task is to make an argument regarding whether the bubble regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act. The issue here is what makes an administrative agency's interpretation of terms in an Act the agency is implementing reasonable.

2. The laws or rules you need to know has been listed after the description of the case. Administrative interpretation of laws is a very complex topic. You do not need to look for more rules for this assignment. The rules listed in the part Rules are all you need to know. In fact, some of those important rules are established after the decision of this case. You need not to worry about which rule(s) is(are) established before or after this case. You need only to focus on the arguments with the given rules.

3. The key to your argument is around what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of an Act by an administrative agency. You do not need use all the rules provided in the assignment. It is OK if you can make a beautiful argument with one rule.

4. The unanimous Supreme Court decision should not be afence that limits your conclusion to the conclusion of the Justice. Remember that Justices Thurgood Marshall, William H. Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O'Connor did not participate. They may have different opinion. You can still have your opinion even all of them have the same votes.

6. Follow the structure of IRAC.

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The Case:

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

Facts of the case

The Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution, such as manufacturing plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed a regulation under the Act that allows states to treat all pollution-emitting devices in the same industrial grouping as though they were a single "bubble". Using this bubble provision, plants may install or modify one piece of equipment without needing a permit if the alteration does not increase the total emissions of the plant. Several environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, challenged the bubble provision as contrary to the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the EPA regulation as inappropriate for a program enacted to improve air quality.

Question

Does the Clean Air Act permit the EPA to define the term "stationary source" to mean whole industrial plants only, which allows plants to build or modify units within plants without the permit required under the Act?

Conclusion

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous court, reversed. The Supreme Court held that the bubble regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act. Congress did not have a specific intention for the interpretation of that term, and the EPA's regulation was a reasonable policy choice. The regulation also provided reasonable accommodations for the many competing interests affected by the Act. Justices Thurgood Marshall, William H. Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O'Connor did not participate.

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Rules

1. If the legislature has given authority to an agency to enforce a statute, then interpretation of that statute by the agency is given great deference by the courts.
2. If the agency's decision has a rational basis it will be upheld by the court at the time of judicial review.
3. courts will give considerable weight to agency's interpretation of a statute only if it satisfies the following four conditions:

• Legislature must have delegated the agency with the responsibility to administer the concerned statute;
• The interpretation must be a reasonable one;
• The specific issue cannot be determined from the plain statutory language; and
• Presence of rationales underlying the rule of deference.

The rationale that must be present includes:

• Confidence of the public on the agency's interpretation;
• Interpretation of agency is a "practical" interpretation of that statute;
• If, after knowing that the statutes are interpreted in a particular manner, the legislature does not alter that interpretation, then it is presumed that it sanctions the agency interpretation.
• If the statute is interpreted "contemporaneously" with the passage of the statute at issue.
• Courts should recognize the expertise of the agency.

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Reference:

Chevron Deference

One of the most important principles in administrative law, The "Chevron Deference" is a term coined after a landmark case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 837 (1984), referring to the doctrine of judicial deference given to administrative actions. In Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth a legal test as to when the court should defer to the agency's answer or interpretation, holding that such judicial deference is appropriate where the agency's answer was not unreasonable, so long as the Congress had not spoken directly to the precise issue at question.The scope of the Chevron deference doctrine is that when a legislative delegation to an administrative agency on a particular issue or question is not explicit but rather implicit, a court may not substitute its own interpretation of the statute for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrative agency. Rather, as Justice Stevens wrote in Chevron, when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's action was based on a permissible construction of the statute. The Chevron deference first requires that the administrative interpretation in question was issued by the agency charged with administering that statute being construed.Accordingly, interpretations by agencies not in charge of that statute in question are not owed any judicial deference. Also, the implicit delegation of authority to an administrative agency to interpret a statute does not extend to the agency's interpretation of its own jurisdiction under that statute.

Generally, to be accorded Chevron deference, the agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute must be permissible, which the court has defined to mean "rational" or "reasonable." In determining the reasonableness of a particular construction of a statute by the agency, the age of that administrative interpretation as well as the congressional action or inaction in response to that interpretation at issue can be a useful guide, if the Congress was aware of the interpretation when it acted or refrained from action, and when the agency's interpretation is not inconsistent with the clear statutory language.

In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of Chevron deference, holding that only the agency interpretations reached through formal proceedings with the force of law, such as adjudications, or notice-and-comment rulemaking, qualify for Chevron deference, while those contained in opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, or other formats that do not carry the force of law are not warranted a Chevron deference. In such cases, the Court may give a slightly less deferential treatment to the agency's interpretation, giving a persuasive value under the Court's "Skidmore deference" analysis.

Last edited by Jonathan Kim, December 2017

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference