Refer to question 2. What strategies would most pairs of players play in the game? O ( T, L) O ( T, R) O (B, L) (B, R)L R T 14,14 0,13 B 13,0 12,12 In the above game, what are the Nash equilibria? O ( T, L ) O (B, R) O (T, L) and (B, R) O There are no equilibriaSuppose that we ran the following experiment. There are 10 players. Each player chooses a number between 0 and 100. The person's whose guess it closest to 1/2 times the average receives a prize of $10. All other players receive 0. If there is a tie for winner, the tied players split the $10. What is the level-2 strategy in this game? O 50 25 12 1/2 O 6 1/4\fWhich of the following is true? A prisoner's dilemma has more than one equilibrium A coordination game has one equilibrium A prisoner's dilemma has no equilibrium A coordination game has more than one equilibriumConsider the following game. In an experiment. where players play the game only once. what actions would you expect to be the most commonly played? L R [I] (T. L] {:1 (T. R] {j} (e. L] {:1 (B. R] \f1|Nhich of the Following is NOT true? [3| In a Prisoner's dilemma with random matching of players in each round most people defect after several rounds. f L} IZZooperation is higher in Prisoner's dilemmas when people are repeatedly matched with the same partner than when they are matched with a new partner in each period. C} Cooperating in a Prisoner's dilemma is a Nash equilibrium to the game .I" .3. The Prisoner's dilemma is an important paradigm in the social sciences x. Refer to question #4. Suppose that two players are playing the game once. Which combinations of actions would be the most commonly observed? O ( T, L ) O (T, R) O (B, L) O (B, R)