refrence the following work

In the case R V Quincy, the material facts of this case are based around the defendant Quincy who runs a sex shop in Nottingham.Quincy was charged with delivering a video recording that was categorized as R18 to an address in Leeds that was not a licensed sex shop, which was in violation of section 12(1) of the Video Act 1985. The charge was brought by the Trading Standards Department of the City Council. Dennis Ackermann a trading standards officer conducted a purchase test when he ordered a R18 video through mail. The video was then delivered to Mr Ackermann in Beeston at his office which was not a licensed sex shop. Quincy was convicted of said offense and fined 3,000, with additional prosecution costs. The case was based around the system in which Quincy conducts his business, as without verification through mail he would be delivering R18 videos to non - licensed sex shops. On appeal to the Administrative Court, the issue was the interpretation of sections 7(2)(c) and 12(1) of the Video Act 1985, specifically regarding the definition of "supply." The prosecution argued that "supply" in this context referred to a transfer of physical possession and should be interpreted broadly to include any manner of supply. The defence contended that the supply occurred in the licensed sex shop where the order was accepted and dispatched. However, the court stood by their decision as "supply" under the Video Act 1985 was not limited to physical possession but encompassed any form of supply, including sale, and emphasized the importance of restricting supply to licensed sex shops to prevent access to restricted material by minors.

When looking at the case R v Quincy I believe the legal issue is centred around the interpretation of the Video Act of 1985, in particular sections 7, 12(1), and the definition of "supply" in section 1(4). The question at hand is whether the distribution of an R18 video recording, which, according to the Act of 1985, can only be distributed in a licensed sex shop, can take place using electronic communication, the telephone, or the mail, even if the customer is not physically present in the licensed sex shop. The meaning of the word "supply" is crucial in the determination of the legal issue in this case.The court had to interpret the meaning of "supply" as defined in section 1(4) of the 1985 Act, which includes various forms of supply, such as sale, letting on hire, exchange, or loan. The court considered whether the delivery of the video recording fell within the definition of "supply" and whether it was restricted to licensed sex shops under section 12(1) of the Act. The prosecution argued that "supply" should be interpreted broadly, consistent with other criminal statutes, to include the transfer of physical possession of the video recording. They contended that restricting supply to licensed sex shops was intended to prevent minors from accessing inappropriate material. The court must decide whether the "supply" occurred in the licensed sex shop, or it happened upon delivery.

Evan Hales LJ used several techniques of statutory interpretation in his judgment mainly the literal rule and the mischief rule among others.When it comes to statutory interpretation, Evan Hales LJ takes a purposive approach, mainly taking a focus on the goals and objectives that were intended to be accomplished by the Video Act of 1985. He places an emphasis on the legislative intent to restrict the supply of video recordings to licensed sex shops to prevent individuals under the age of 18 from gaining access to these recordings. In addition, Hales LJ employs the contextual approach, which considers the broader context of the legislation as well as the effect that it is intended to have on the protection of the public and the regulation of video content. In addition to this, he applies the golden rule of statutory interpretation, which is to interpret the law in a way that avoids absurd outcomes and is in accordance with the intent of the legislature. Hales LJ acknowledges the literal wording of the statute, particularly emphasizing the phrase "no video recording containing that work is to be supplied other than in a licensed sex shop" from section 7(2)(c) of the Video Act 1985. He interprets this provision considering its plain meaning, emphasizing the restriction on supply outside of licensed sex shops to protect the public from sensitive content if access is unregulated. This ensures that fairness is upheld as it protects the public while maintaining the position of the law.

The aids to statutory interpretation employed by Evan Hales LJare as follows,to interpret the meaning of "supply" and the requirements for supplying R18 video recordings, Hales LJ might have made direct reference to the text of the Video Act 1985 and conducts an analysis of its provisions. These provisions include sections 1(4), 7 and 12(1). He carefully examines the rhetoric of the statute to determine the intention of the legislature and to clarify any ambiguities, which is an intrinsic aid as it looks at the language used in the statue to assess the overall meaning. Hales LJ looks at the reason as to why the Video act of 1985 was created which details an inability to access harmful content by minors, this allows him to look at the law from a wider point of view. The extrinsic aids are used to provide guidance for his interpretation of the term "supply" in the Video Act 1985, Hales LJ considers judicial precedents and interpretations of similar terms in other statutes, such as the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the Road Traffic Act 1988 as well as other sources such as historical context and perhaps to some extent scholars reports. It is through the examination of how comparable terms have been interpreted in various legal contexts that he is able to enrich both his understanding of statutory rhetoric and his own application of it. Conclusively the analysis of both aids allowed him to come up with a suitable judgement.

The ratio decidendi of the case is centred around the various interpretations of the word "supply" in accordance to of the Video Act 1985, specifically sections 7(2)(c) and 12(1), and section 1(4) of the Act, as well as its application in the case of R v Quincy.