S2. The restaurant pricing game illustrated in Figure 5.1 defines customer demand functions for meals at Xavier's (Qx) and Yvonne's (Qy) as (x = 44 2Px + Py, and Qy = 44 2Py + Px. Profits for each firm depend in ad- dition on their costs of serving each customer. Suppose that Yvonne's is able to reduce its costs to a mere $2 per customer by completely elimi- nating the wait staff (customers pick up their orders at the counter, and a few remaining employees bus the tables). Xavier's continues to incur a cost of $8 per customer. (a) Recalculate the best-response rules and the Nash equilibrium prices for the two firms, given the change in the cost conditions. (b) Graph the two best-response curves and describe the differences between your graph and Figure 5.1. In particular, which curve has moved and by how much? Explain why these changes occurred in the diagram. S2. The restaurant pricing game illustrated in Figure 5.1 defines customer demand functions for meals at Xavier's (Qx) and Yvonne's (Qy) as (x = 44 2Px + Py, and Qy = 44 2Py + Px. Profits for each firm depend in ad- dition on their costs of serving each customer. Suppose that Yvonne's is able to reduce its costs to a mere $2 per customer by completely elimi- nating the wait staff (customers pick up their orders at the counter, and a few remaining employees bus the tables). Xavier's continues to incur a cost of $8 per customer. (a) Recalculate the best-response rules and the Nash equilibrium prices for the two firms, given the change in the cost conditions. (b) Graph the two best-response curves and describe the differences between your graph and Figure 5.1. In particular, which curve has moved and by how much? Explain why these changes occurred in the diagram