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4. There are N firms in an industry each having the same cost function TC(Q) = 10Q. Every period the firms play a Bertrand price game in which they simultaneously set prices. Assume that there are 40 new (different consumers in each period. They each purchase from the firm that charges the lowest price. If more than one firm charges the lowest price, then the consumers are allocated equally across all of the firms having the lowest price. The consumers have a reservation price of $15, which means that each will pay up to $15 for the product, but no more than that. Finally, assume the firms play the game described above every period from now to infinity A) What is the collusive price? B) Suppose that the firms collude and that there are N= 4 firms. How much will ONE firm earn each period? C) Suppose that the firms collude and that there are N= 8 firms. How much will ONE firm earn each period? D) What is the Present Value of collusion profits for ONE firm if there are N= 4 firms assuming an interest rate of 10%? Repeat for the interest rate of 20%. E) What is the Present Value of collusion profits for ONE firm if there are N=8 firms assuming an interest rate of 10%? Repeat for the interest rate of 20%. For each of the following scenarios, determine whether the firms will be able to sustain collusion by comparing the present value of collusive profits to the profits if it cheats. You may NOT use the N