Solve clearly..

For the fattening questions; 1} Use the I sign for writing probabilities. Example: Correct: \"100 Wrong: 0.01 2} Simplify the fractions to their minimum possible values. Example: Wrong: 5&0 Correct: \"4 11.2 x Y z x 5,1 2,2 3.1 Y 4.2 5,6 4'7 2 3,3 24 5.5 Select the pure strategy Nash Equilibriun'iquuilibria of the above game?: Suppose the above game is repeated for two periods. Which of the following is an SPE of the repeated game? A v Now suppose the game is potentially repeated innitely. Players do not know for sure when the game will end. They assign probability p that the game continues the next period and probability 1-p that it will not. There is no discounting, that is 6 = 1 for both players. Consider the following strategy: Play Y in the first period. In all periods other than the first one play Y if {TN} has been played in all previous periodsI otherwise play Z forever. The above strategy is SPE if p is c