Stage 1: There is $100. Player 1 may demand $25 or $75 (leaving the rest for player 2). Stage 2: Player 2 observes 1's demand, and decides whether to accept the offer or reject it. If it accepted, 1's proposal is implemented and the game ends. If it is rejected, the game continues to stage 3. In Stage 3, $40 is removed from the available total and given to a third party, leaving $60 to be divided among players 1 and 2. Player 2 must demand $10 or $50 (leaving the rest for player 1). The game then proceeds to Stage 4. In Stage 4, Player 1 decides whether to accept 2's proposal. If it is accepted, then the proposal is implemented and the game ends. If it is rejected, then each player receives a payoff of zero and the game ends. Each player's payoff is simply the money she receives. There is no discounting. (a) Draw a game tree representing this game in extensive form. (b) Is there a Nash equilibrium to this game in which player 1 gets a payoff of 75