Stargell and Schmidt are brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (HC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0-80 per can. Assume that nenher firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Stargell and Schmidt form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.] Place the black pount (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Stargell and Schmidt choose to work together. Monopoly Outcome 1.40 1.00 PRICE (Collars per cing MC BAIG2.00 1.80 Monopoly Outcome 1.60 Demand 1:40 1.20 1.00 PRICE (Dollars per can) MC = ATC 0.80 D.60 0.40 0.20 MR 80 160 240 320 400 480 560 640 720 800 QUANTITY (Cans of beer)When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce cans and charge $ per can, Given this information, each fum eems a daily profit of $ . so the daily total industry profit in the beer market a $ Oligopoliyis often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together, Both firms initially agree to produce hall the quantity that maximizea total industry profit Now, suppose that Stargell decades to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while Schmidt continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement Sterpell's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to to per can. Stargell's profit is now , while Schmide's profit is now - Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit when Stargell increases its output beyond the collusive quantly