Stargell and Schmidt are brewing companles that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals averoge total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Stargell and Schmidt form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantly of output if stargelf and Schmidt choose to work together. When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce cans and charge per can. Given this information, each firm earns a dally profit of so the dally total industry proft in the beer market is Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profic in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry. profit. Now, suppose that Stargell decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while Schmidt continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Stargell's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to. Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit when Stargeli increases its output beyond the collusive quantity