strategies employed by bidders in these 2 auctions sometimes create larger problems than those they were meant to solve, casting doubts on the overall efficacy of the average-bid auction format. The goal of this exercise is to investigate a simple version of this auction in the case of private values. The setup mirrors closely what we discussed in class, featuring an auction for a single item. For simplicity, let's consider only two bidders participating. Each bidder's valuation is uniformly distributed independently within the interval [0, 100]. The rules of the auction are as follows: The highest bid secures the object. Only the winner is required to make a payment. The amount paid by the winner is the average of the two bids (i.e., the sum of both bids divided by two). Question a. (20 marks) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? Question b. (20 marks) It was commonly believed that an average-bid auction will generate higher revenues than either a first-price or second-price sealed-bid auction. Is there any truth to this view? What is the expected revenue for the seller in such an auction