strike one of th a. Army A has a single plane possible targets. Army B has one anti-aircraft gun that can be assigned to one of the targets in defence. Army A wishes to maximize the expected value of the damage and army B wishes to minimize it. The value of target k for each player is Vk, with V1>V2>V3>0. Note: For simplicity assume v1=1, v2=2 and v3=3 for each player. Army A can destroy a target only if the target is undefended and A attacks it. In this case the payoffs will be (Vk, - Vk) respectively for Players A and B. If B successfully defends a target, the payoffs are 0 for each player. Formulate the situation as a strategic game and solve for all Nash equilibrium/ia. Hint: Army A has 3 strategies: Attack 1, Attack 2, and Attack 3. Army B has 3 strategies: Defend 1, Defend 2, and Defend 3. [10marks] b. Consider the games depicted below. Player 2 knows which game is being played but player 1 does not. Player 1 believes that with probability 3/4 Game 1 is being played. Solve for all pure Bayes Nash equilibria. 112 L U 2,1 D -1,2 Game 1 R 2,3 -2,1 1\2 U D Game2 L 6,9 7,-10 R -10,-5 14,5