Suppose a major college football program and a network are negotiating an exclusive rights to a television deal to the 2023 college football season. If the deal is reached it will generate $60 million in revenue to be split among both parties. If no deal is reached, the college football program will make $24 million from their existing deal and the network will make $12 million from alternative programming.

1. (a)Without making any additional assumptions about the problem, what basic predictions will game theory make about this situation?
2. (b)Assume the network has twice as much power as the college football program. What is the Nash cooperative bargaining solution to the problem?
3. (c)Consider now an alternative case. At the beginning of the 2020, 2021, and 2022 seasons the network and college football program will have the opportunity to reach an agree- ment. If they don't reach agreement after 2022 the deal will not go through. Further, the value of the deal will decay. Both sides will generate $60 million (as before) if an agreement is reached in 2020, $50 million in 2021 and $40 million in 2022. The net- work will make offers in 2020 and 2022; the college football program will make offers in 2021. Assume both sides still have the same alternatives as before if an agreement is not reached. What will be the non-cooperative outcome to this bargaining game?