Suppose Samsung and Vizio can collaborate on the production of LED TV's. Samsung produces all the parts and Vizio assembles. If both firms exert optimal effort, the probability is 0.25 that they will generate a revenue of $600 million, which they will split equally. A sub-optimal level of effort from one firm reduces the probability of achieving a revenue of $600 million to 0.15, whereas if both firms shirk, the probably is reduced to only 0.10. Assume that optimal effort costs $35 million, whereas shirking costs $0.

What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game in base form.

Also What is the Nash Equilibrium if they both spend $20 million on an observer to ensures that shirkers pay a $30 million penalty to the non-shirker.

What is the Nash Equilibrium if they use anti-insurance service. The anti-insurance service matches revenue dollar for dollar up to $600 million. Thus, for example, if the firms achieve joint revenue of $600 million, the AI firm will add $600 million to the total, so that each firm receives $600 million. In exchange for anti-insurance contract, firms A and B each pay the Aanti-insurance serviceI $90 million in advance.