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Suppose that each agent's value Vi is drawn independently from the same strictly increasing distribution F [0, h]. Find the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy
Suppose that each agent's value Vi is drawn independently from the same strictly increasing distribution F [0, h]. Find the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in a second-price auction with a reserve price of r, a first-price auction with a reserve price of r, an all-pay auction with a reserve price of r
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Microeconomics
Authors: Dean Karlan, Jonathan Morduch
1st edition
978-0077332587, 007733258X, 978-0077332648, 77332644, 978-1259163531
