Suppose that we have three voters and four alternatives, and suppose the individual preference lists are as follows:

Voter $1$: abcd

Voter $2$: cabd

Voter $3$: bdca

Suppose that the social choice procedure being used is sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda, and that you have agenda$-$setting power $($that is$,$ you get to choose the order$).$ What order should you choose if you want alternative $a$ to be the social choice?

a vs$.$ c$,$ then winner vs$.$ b$,$ then winner vs$.$ d

c vs$.$ d$,$ then winner vs$.$ b$,$ then winner vs$.$ a

a vs$.$ c$,$ then winner vs$.$ d$,$ then winner vs$.$ b

a vs$.$ d$,$ then winner vs$.$ b$,$ then winner vs$.$ c

a vs$.$ b$,$ then winner vs$.$ c$,$ then winner vs$.d$