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Suppose the payment scheme is second-pricing: the winner i pays p(b) = max bj , j = i, and the losers pay nothing. Show that

Suppose the payment scheme is second-pricing: the winner i pays p(b) = max bj , j = i, and the losers pay nothing. Show that it is a dominant strategy to bid truthfully, b i = vi

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