Suppose we have a game where 51 = {H, L} and $2 = {X, Y}. If player 1plays H, then her payoff is z regardless of player 2's choice of strategy; player 1's other payoffnumbers are u1[L, X) = 0 and u2(L, Y) = 10. You may choose any payoff numbers you like for player 2 because we will only be concerned with player 1's payoff. (a) Draw the normal form of this game. b) If player 1's belief is 92 = (1/2, 1/2), what is player 1's expected payoff of playing H?what is player 1's expected payoff of playing L? For what value of z is playing indifferent between playing H and L? C) Suppose 92 = (1/3, 2/3). Find player 1's expected payoff of playing L