Suppose we have a population in which females can decide the sex of their offspring. Each individual has a strategy that represents the proportion of their offspring that are female. We assume that each female (if they survive to reproductive maturity) will mate once, and every mated female produces some large number of offspring, C. Hence for a mated female playing strategy , they will have C female and (1 )C male offspring. Now, we introduce a twist to the standard model by supposing that there is a sex-dependent probability that an individual will survive to reproductive maturity. We will denote by: m the probability that a male survives to reproductive maturity (0 < m 1) f the probability that a female survives to reproductive maturity (0 < f 1) One important note: these survival probabilities are the same for every individual in the population, regardless of their strategy. (a) (1 marks) Consider a single mated female playing mutant strategy in a resident population consisting of N mated females that all play resident strategy . Let f and m represent the number of females and males, respectively, that survive to reproductive maturity in the