Task 6: Initial Vector (IV) Most of the encryption modes require an initial vector (IV). Properties of an IV depend on the cryptographic scheme used. If we are not careful in selecting IVs, the data encrypted by us may not be secure at all, even though we are using a secure encryption algorithm and mode. The objective of this task is to help students understand the problems if an IV is not selected properly. Please do the following experiments:

Task 6.1. A basic requirement for IV is uniqueness, which means that no IV may be reused under the same key. To understand why, please encrypt the same plaintext using (1) two different IVs, and (2) the same IV. Please describe your observation, based on which, explain why IV needs to be unique.

Task 6.2. One may argue that if the plaintext does not repeat, using the same IV is safe. Let us look at the Output Feedback (OFB) mode. Assume that the attacker gets hold of a plaintext (P1) and a ciphertext (C1) , can he/she decrypt other encrypted messages if the IV is always the same? You are given the following information, please try to figure out the actual content of P2 based on C2, P1, and C1.

Plaintext (P1): This is a known message! Ciphertext (C1): a469b1c502c1cab966965e50425438e1bb1b5f9037a4c159 Plaintext (P2): (unknown to you) Ciphertext (C2): bf73bcd3509299d566c35b5d450337e1bb175f903fafc159

If we replace OFB in this experiment with CFB (Cipher Feedback), how much of P2 can be revealed? You only need to answer the question; there is no need to demonstrate that. The attack used in this experiment is called the known-plaintext attack, which is an attack model for cryptanalysis where the attacker has access to both the plaintext and its encrypted version (ciphertext). If this can lead to the revealing of further secret information, the encryption scheme is not considered as secure

Task 6.3. From the previous tasks, we now know that IVs cannot repeat. Another important requirement on IV is that IVs need to be unpredictable for many schemes, i.e., IVs need to be randomly generated. In this task, we will see what is going to happen if IVs are predictable. Assume that Bob just sent out an encrypted message, and Eve knows that its content is either Yes or No; Eve can see the ciphertext and the IV used to encrypt the message, but since the encryption algorithm AES is quite strong, Eve has no idea what the actual content is. However, since Bob uses predictable IVs, Eve knows exactly what IV Bob is going to use next. The following summarizes what Bob and Eve know:

Encryption method: 128-bit AES with CBC mode. Key (in hex): 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff (known only to Bob) Ciphertext (C1): bef65565572ccee2a9f9553154ed9498 (known to both) IV used on P1 (known to both) (in ascii): 1234567890123456 (in hex) : 31323334353637383930313233343536 Next IV (known to both) (in ascii): 1234567890123457 (in hex) : 31323334353637383930313233343537

A good cipher should not only tolerate the known-plaintext attack described previously, it should also tolerate the chosen-plaintext attack, which is an attack model for cryptanalysis where the attacker can obtain the ciphertext for an arbitrary plaintext. Since AES is a strong cipher that can tolerate the chosen-plaintext attack, Bob does not mind encrypting any plaintext given by Eve; he does use a different IV for each plaintext, but unfortunately, the IVs he generates are not random, and they can always be predictable. Your job is to construct a message P2 and ask Bob to encrypt it and give you the ciphertext. Your objective is to use this opportunity to figure out whether the actual content of P1 is Yes or No. You can read thisWikipedia page for ideas: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initialization_ vector.

There are more advanced cryptanalysis on IV that is beyond the scope of this lab. Students can read the article posted in this URL: https://defuse.ca/cbcmodeiv.htm. Because the requirements on IV really depend on cryptographic schemes, it is hard to remember what properties should be maintained when we select an IV. However, we will be safe if we always use a new IV for each encryption, and the new IV needs to be generated using a good pseudo random number generator, so it is unpredictable by adversaries. See another SEED labs (Random Number Generation Lab) for details on how to generate cryptographically strong pseudo random numbers.