Ten commuters must decide simultaneously in the morning to use route A or route B to go from home (same place for all) to work (ditto). If a of them use route A, each of them will travel for 10a + 40 minutes; if b of them use route B, each of them will travel for 10 minutes. Everyone wishes to minimize his/her commuting time. Your tasks: a. [12% ] Describe the pure Nash equilibrium (or Nash equilibria) of this ten-person game. Compute the corresponding profile of commuting times. Explicitly list all equilibrium conditions that are satisfied b. [6% | What is the traffic pattern (strategies) minimizing the total travel time of all commuters (the sum of their travel times)? Describe the corresponding profile of commuting times individual payoffs/cost). c. [7% ] What does this mean about the Price of Anarchy of this game (assuming that the objective function is the total travel time)