The Case Study Toyota from the early $1960$s alongside their supplier network consolidated the way in which they were able to refine their production system through the introduction of specific quality improvement methodologies $($Cole$,2011)$ eg$.$ the Toyota Production System $($TPS$).$ The TPS changed the way the automotive industry produced vehicles i$.$e$.$ the industry had moved from a craft model to mass production and with TPS there was a move from the principles of mass to lean production $($Andrews et al$.,2011).$ These specific methodologies paved the way for the development of a total quality system that provided the foundation for the Six Sigma methodology $($Cole$,2011).$ Additionally, the clear correlation between quality, customer satisfaction and profit led Toyota, over time, to make quality a key business driver and MEC AMO TEM $03503$ Page $1$ of $14$ QUALITY MANAGEMENT $($BUSS$-$B $2008)-$SPRING $2022-$CW$3($IA$)-$ QP therefore an integral part of their strategy, their organisational design and their production system $($Heller and Darling, $2011$; Liker, $2004).$ Nonetheless, from September $2009,$ Toyota began to recall millions of vehicles over an extended period due to a series of issues. These recalls began in the US after a fatal accident caused by a design flaw in a Toyota vehicle which subsequently received widespread negative media coverage $($Cole$,2011).$ As a result, the reputation of Toyota vehicles, as the best in class in terms of quality, was negatively affected $($Fan et al$.,2013)$ with public perception showing a drop from first to $20$ out of $28$ brands in the space of six months after the fatal crash $($Tsikoudakis$,2011).$ This report will look at the causes of this significant decline and impact on the Toyota brand in more detail as well as how well Toyota managed the problem both internally and externally. Additionally, recommendations will be suggested as to how Toyota could have better prepared themselves or avoided to a certain degree the crisis. Finally, the lessons that other automotive companies can learn from the Toyota case study will be shared. What went wrong with the Toyota way? As mentioned above, the TPS was a move away from the principles of mass production i$.$e$.$ an environment where parts were interchangeable and with an emphasis on the assembly line, to one of lean production where the emphasis was put on reduced variability within the production process. This change in focus therefore, reduced the time required to produce a unit and increased the control over quality at each stage $($Andrews et al$.,2011).$ This change of focus was complemented by empowering the employees to make certain decisions as well building up strategic partnerships with suppliers $($Cole$,2011).$ In order to better understand and provide a context as to what went wrong at Toyota, it is important to understand the fourteen Business Principles of Toyota $($BPTS$)($Liker$,2004).$ The fourteen BPTS are $1)$ adopt a long$-$term philosophy, $2)$ have a continuous process flow, $3)$ create a system that pulls work to avoid too much inventory, $4)$ create an environment where the workload is manageable and consistent $($Heijunka$),5)$ implement a quality first system, $6)$ standardise tasks, $7)$ make sure all controls are visible, $8)$ only use tried and tested systems and technology, $9)$ invest in your people to grow leaders, $10)$ develop those people into exceptional leaders, $11)$ respect partners and help them to grow, $12)$ experience situations to understand them $($Genchi Genbutsu$),13)$ foster a culture of calculated and negotiated decision$-$making with fast implementation, and finally $14)$ learn as an organisation through reflection $($Hansei$)$ and continuous improvement $($Kaizen$).$ It is possible to see how the decision to aggressively capture global market share as well as the increasing complexity of Toyota's product portfolio created an imbalance within the fourteen business principles of Toyota and therefore put unnecessary stress on an already lean process $($Cole$,2011$; Piotrowski and Guyette, $2010).$ The aggressive growth strategy adopted by Toyota from $1995$ up until the crisis in $2009$ was not in line with several of the $14$ BPTS e$.$g$.4,5,9,10,11,12,13$ and $14.$ The growth strategy in terms of capturing market share was successful insomuch that in the year before the recall crisis, Toyota had captured $13\%$ of the market share but at a cost $($Cole$,2011).$ The effect of growth on quality Despite the impressive growth achieved with this strategy, there was not a comparable increase in Toyota's capacity to deliver the increased volumes to the level of quality that was expected ie$.$ Ps $4,5$ and $14.$ The Toyota Board made a conscious decision to focus on profit without considering all of the reputational risks that this approach could cause the brand le customer dissatisfaction, changes in customer perceptions, loss of loyal customers, etc. in the short and long$-$term $($Fan et al$.2013$ Todas, $2011).$ The philosophy of Toyota previously was one that would focus on steady calculated powth PT $131,$ with this growth strategy however, decisions were made too quickly le there was an over confidence on the part of the Board to believe that the TPS could withstand the added demands of increased volumes $($Heller and Darling, $2011)$ Nevertheless, attempts were made by Toyota to address the capacity issue by hiring additional staff, contracting engineers as well as contracting the services of new non$-$Japanese suppliers to work at the increased number of manufacturing facilities $($Cole$,2011).$ This change in approach from the traditional way of empowering staff and developing strategic long$-$lasting relationships with its suppliers contributed to the imbalance of the $14$ BPT$.$ Specifically, in this case although the capacity to meet demand had been met by increasing the manufacturing sites and by increasing the staff levels, the capability of these teams to deliver to the level of quality was affected $($Andrews et al$,2013).$ In this aggressive quick to market approach adopted by Toyota the BPTs affected by this decision were $9$ and $30,$ implying that staff and engineers did not share the philosophy of quality first eller and Darling $2011)$ but were focused rather on sales targets and volume Further complicating this panorama, was the way that suppliers were on boarded in terms of speed during this time of expansion $($Cole$,2011).$ OPT $11$ stresses the importance of developing long lasting strategic relationships with suppliers that understand the core values of the organisation $($Chopra & Mind, $20131$ and in that way are able to grow with the organisation. Nevertheless, during this period of rapid unprecedented growth, suppliers were chosen without the necessary lead in time to establish this common goal $($Cole$,2011)$ This coupled with the financial crisis of $2008$ and the fact that due to the lan production approach $($Andrews et al$.2011)$ suppliers needed to make daily deliveries, issues with the supply chain began to emerge, orders were delayed and quality was compromised $($Andrews et al$.2011)$ Finally, P$12,$ which focuses on Genchi Genbutsu and the need to experience and see the issue yourself, was compromised due to the fact that key strategic decisions were still being made at head office in Japan without aftappraisal of the situation $($Heller and Darling, $2011$ The effect of product complexity on quality The automotive industry is a highly consumer driven and competitive market which is constantly evolving and becoming more and more complex in terms of design, aerodynamics, engine design, fuel efficiency. electronics, etc. $($Cole$,2011).$ Under normal circumstances without market pressures, the process within Toyota from design to car$-$on$-$the$-$road was a smooth, tried, tested and efficient process that had quality at its heart $($Andrews et al$.2011).$ Nonetheless, the added complexity of the cans' designs coupled with the aggressive growth strategy with all of the inherent consequences mentioned above caused a system already under strain to buckle $($Heller and Darling, $2001).$ In terms of the fourteen BPTS$,$ the added product AMO TEM $03503$ Page QUALITY MANAGEMENT $($BUSS$-82008)-$SPRING $2022-$CW$3($A$)-$OP complexity affected BPTS $2,3,6$ and $7$ due to the fact that there were now also more vehicle models to produce in a shorter period with relatively inexperienced staff in the philosophy of Toyota. This situation thus affected the ability to identify issues in quality $($BPT $2),$ standardise tasks $($BPT $6)$ and test the components and systems with enough rigour $(7)$ before production Le Cole $(2011)$ highlights that the process from design to sale was compressed to $20$ months in order to meet the demands of the market. Additionally, with a wide product range, the increased complexity and the need to onboard new global suppliers, it became more and more challenging to guarantee the consistent delivery on a daily basis of parts $($BPT $3)$ thus creating a huge dependency on the supplier network to deliver Le$.$ a failure to deliver would have a disproportionate knock$-$on effect on Toyota's ability to full orders $($Cole$,2011)$ Furthermore, the hiring of temporary contract engineers affected the way in which Toyota's supply chain were able to adequately provide parts insomuch that traditionally the Toyota engineers were also the relationship$/$account managers with the suppliers and introducing a high churn rate of engineers meant that the quality of the relationship deteriorated and therefore BPT $11$ suffered $($Andrews et al$.,2011).$ What was the effect on Toyota? As alluded to in the introduction, the reputational damage caused by the widely publicised fatality, mass recalls and negative media coverage was enormous $($fan et al$,2013).$ It could be said that before the crisis Toyota enjoyed a significant positive halo effect insomuch that consumers would perhaps ignore minor issues with the vehicle because they were experiencing a cognitive bias towards Toyota and the association with quality. Nevertheless, once the crisis hit, the damage to the brand was exacerbated by the fact that Toyota were a company whose value proposition was the production of the highest quality cars le consumers purchased a Toyota because of the reputation for quality and after the incident in $2009$ that confidence was shattered $($Tsikoudakis$,2011).$ In relative terms and based on the data provided by Cole $(2011),$ the relative quality of Toyota compared to other brands in the market had actually improved overall between $2000$ and $2009.$ However, after the negative media coverage, customer perceptions around Toyota on various fronts Le leadership, quality, reliability, honesty, believability $($Piotrowski and Guyette, $2010)$ in absolute terms plummeted. In other words, public confidence in the Toyota brand although in relative terms had not deteriorated significantly in absolute terms in the eyes of the customer was at an all$-$time low $($Fan et al$.,2013).$ The response of Toyota to the crisis can be divided into Tomacro areas with a focusing on how Toyota responded to the immedue med after the fatality and at of the mass reca focusing on how Toyota responded internally to the us that had caused the brand deterio atute terms in the eyes of the consumer $($kodas $2011)$ Her and Darling $(2011)$ that crises should be divided into four stages primary crisista acute stage, chronous tap and the crus resolution stage. The key, the authors suggest is being able to identify the precis stage the stage in which an seisidened and therefore the e and chronic stages san beaded with a move directly to the cms resolution stage in the cat Heller and bang $(2001)$ the persis stage was in $2007$ when $15,000$ vistes were rea for the sam that the fatality in $2009$ Toyota had acted upon this in $2007$ and rea AMO TEM $05\mathrm{.}03$ QUALITY MANAGEMENT $($BUSS $2008)-$SPRING $2022-$CW JIA$)$ QA et contemplate a crisis of this es caused by natural des been able to control the situation much more effectively $($Tak$,2011)$ probable that to the aggressive growth strategy and the balance that this created within the fourteen PTs that this was never even the importance deserved $($Cule$,2011,$ eller and Darling $2011,$ To $2011$ Furthore, according to Her and Darking $(2011$ Tots nature rather had fouted their crus management processes on ed to ones caused internally $($C$2011$ Atly to the centralised nature of Toyota and the lack of everes management structure, the media responses provided by Topita were not matte the time difference Chaoua, $2011).$ This delay created the sensation that the cris was not being treated as importantly it should have been otrow and Guette $2010$ thus affecting negatively t brand Once the acute stage of the crisis had passed and had moved to the chronic stage, Toyota began to try to remedy the station externally by emphasing the brand party and duty without immediate sutress Cale, $2011,$ eller and Darling $2011)$ and thus alating the beurofar cres Le Ford where recovery took much longer the Moreover, Toyota ideed and cly recoge their fangster of stay and fond fundamental changes to their global footprint reduction of manufacturing the employe structure, more Toyota permanent staff, their management structure in giving decision making powers to regional hubs and their product portfolio le a reduction in the different production Lessons learn from the analysis of this case study, the lessons that competitors could learn from this negative experience cover various areas in terms of growing and expanding the business, this should be carried out in line with the organisation's core principles and values ie growth should not be achieved at all cost but rather at the same rate as the organisation's capacity and capability $($Cole$,2011).$ Regarding the product portfolio$/$ange$,$ the organisation should follow a focus strategy that reduces the number of different products so that quality can be controlled and embedded into the production process more effectively $($Andrews et al$.2011).$ Furthermore, all organisations should have an agreed crisis management process, no matter how unlikely the organisation feels a crisis could happen as this will allow them to identify crises before they happen and remedy them before they become acute and chronic eller and Darling $2011),$ finally, an organisation should protect and nurture the reputation and the customer perception of that brand as this is an organisation's currency in highly competitive markets which when damaged does not recover immediately $($Piotrowski and Guvette, $2010$: Tukud $2011)$What mainly wrong with Toyota way