The following payoff matrix shows the outcomes for two tennis players: a server and a receiver. Each player can play a forehand (F) or a backhand (B). Server F . Receiver F 20,80 90,10 30,70 B 60,40 (a) Use best response analysis to find any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (b) Suppose the Server aims Forehands with a probability and Backhands with 1-9 probability. What are the receiver expected payoffs? (C) Suppose the Receiver moves Forehands with p probability. What are the expected payoffs for the server? (d) Find the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium for this game. (e) Explain the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium from the perspective of the Server. In other words, please explain why the server should always play his/her mixed strategies equilibrium mix of F and B. The following payoff matrix shows the outcomes for two tennis players: a server and a receiver. Each player can play a forehand (F) or a backhand (B). Server F . Receiver F 20,80 90,10 30,70 B 60,40 (a) Use best response analysis to find any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (b) Suppose the Server aims Forehands with a probability and Backhands with 1-9 probability. What are the receiver expected payoffs? (C) Suppose the Receiver moves Forehands with p probability. What are the expected payoffs for the server? (d) Find the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium for this game. (e) Explain the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium from the perspective of the Server. In other words, please explain why the server should always play his/her mixed strategies equilibrium mix of F and B