The game below depicts revenue to the New York Knicks and the Brooklyn Nets based on the number of games they decide to broadcast locally. Assume they serve the same metropolitan area, and each team pursues a strategy of best response.

i) The Knicks-- a dominant strategy in this game, the Nets--a dominant strategy in this game

a) Do have; do have b) do not have; do have c) do have; do not have d) do not have; do not have

ii) The Nash equilibrium in this game is for the Knicks to broadcast--- game for the Nets to broadcast-- game

a) 30;30 b) 30;40 c) 40;30 d) 40;40

iii) Were the two teams able to collude and reach an enforceable agreement, they would each broadcast--- game and --- would be better off than at the Nash equilibrium in (ii) above

a) 30; each team b) 30; only the Nets c) 30; only the knicks d) 40; neither team

iv. The stability of any agreement these two teams might reach gets stronger if

a) The game is played repeatedly b) Either team can successfully punish cheaters c) Both a and b are true

d) Neither a nor b is true

So, I think for the first on "a" ii(40,40) ,iii(30, each team), iv( a)

Thank you

KNICKS 40 games 30 games NETS 40 $ 10 85 games 10 mik . mil. mil $ 20 30 $ 20 $15 games mil. mil. mil