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Question 1 Case 1: Express Transit Maintenance Division, Part A (due 10/17 before class) What factors caused problems to occur for Express Transit? What can Jiles do to make things better?

Here is the text

This case is provided to Electronic Hallway subscribers with the express permission of the author, J. Patrick Dobel, at University of Washington's Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs and Doug Micheau. Edited by Maggie Brown from Media Relations Communications.

The Electronic Hallway is administered by the University of Washington's Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs. This material may not be altered or copied without written permission from The Electronic Hallway.. Electronic Hallway members are granted copy permission for educational purposes per Member's Agreement (www.hallway.org). Copyright 2004 The Electronic Hallway

EXPRESS TRANSIT MAINTENANCE DIVISION (A)

Martin Jiles, Executive Director of Express, was still stunned as he walked home from the local 7-Eleven with the morning paper that September Saturday. The page one article of the Centerville Globe had caught him completely unaware, its headline screaming: "ARE EXPRESS BUSES UNSAFE? Drivers, mechanics say bosses falsify maintenance records."

In the article, bus drivers and mechanics alleged that Express supervisors had doctored maintenance records to conceal decisions allowing unsafe and environment-damaging buses on the streets of Progress County. Further, transit workers alleged that Express management pressured them to falsify inspection reports, and they accused Express of suppressing dissent through harassment and intimidation. The article also cited numerous sources who said Express had adopted a covert policy of allowing buses to leak oil, because that was cheaper than repairing them. Workers and union representatives said maintenance problems were the worst at Express's North Side Base. There, a "phantom mechanic" - the common nickname for a computer code number representing a supervisory mechanic who does not exist - frequently overruled front-line inspectors' "bad order" directives meant to keep unsafe or mechanically defective buses off the streets (see Exhibit 1).

Not only did the article's damaging revelations come as a complete surprise to Jiles, but its timing could not have been worse: Express had just launched a marketing campaign to reverse a decline in bus ridership.

As Express Executive Director, Jiles headed a major public corporation with the responsibility to provide countywide transit (bus and related) services. Express Transit employed 2,700 persons (full-time-equivalent) and had an annual budget of more than $300 million.

Over the years, Express had earned a national reputation as a successful, innovative organization, one that took risks but still maintained accountability to the public. The Transit Division, in particular, had received many national acknowledgements and awards for its management abilities, safety records, and use of new technologies, as well as for having one of the lowest ratios of service personnel to fleet size. Express ran the first articulated buses in the nation, and it was among the first transit systems to add wheelchair lifts to its entire fleet. Express had also pioneered a free-ride district in downtown Centerville.

All of these accomplishments related directly to the "can-do" philosophy and results-oriented management style that Martin Jiles's predecessors had instilled in the organization. Jiles

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regarded the organization's staff and its culture very positively and was proud of its past record and continuing accomplishments.

Jiles had headed Express for about eight years, coming from a strong background in senior public service positions around the country. Frank Preston, the Transportation Services Director, had come to Express about four years earlier from a position as deputy transportation coordinator for a large transit system. Although only forty years old, Preston was well known within industry circles for his abilities as a transit manager.

The Transit Division faced significant challenges: declining bus ridership, flat revenues, dramatically decreased federal funding, and an aging bus fleet, which numbered 1,300. Approximately 61 million passengers annually rode Express buses, down from 66 million six years earlier. However, ridership in the vanpooling program, the largest such program of any transit system in the nation, was growing.

The Transit Division, in keeping with its can-do, results oriented organizational culture, took a Management by Objectives (MBO) approach to ensure maximum efficiency and effectiveness at all organizational levels. Specific targets were established for all divisions, and performance towards achieving these targets was monitored through sophisticated data collection systems. Data, in the form of summary statistics and reports, provided the management offices in downtown Centerville with the necessary indications of how well the system was performing. Express used these same reports and statistics in annual performance evaluations of managers under its Pay-For-Performance (PFP) plan. The PFP plan used specific indicators of each manager's effectiveness to award monetary incentives and merit pay increases. For example, the base supervisor was evaluated by the following summary reports: 1) miles between trouble calls; 2) expenditures within approved budget; 3) yard delays; 4) parts delays due to unavailability; 5) adequate stock quantities in the Unit Rebuild Division; and 6) maintenance costs per coach operating hour. The PFP system extended from the top of the organization's management structure downward through the base supervisors in the Maintenance Division.

"Safety is Express's number one priority," said Transit Director Preston. "Next is service, then the budget." It was the job of each manager to balance these three competing demands. "Efficiency is the key," he said. "The system we have pursued provides resources efficiently, smartly." But he also acknowledged that the system exerted real pressure on the Manager of Vehicle Maintenance and the base supervisors. It was a daily pressure, said managers in the Maintenance Division, who responded by containing costs where they could. There was a pervasive belief among managers that they were perceived as poor performers if they "bucked the system" by asking for more money. Never was this pressure felt more keenly than during annual budget meetings.

This was certainly the case when Clayton Baker, Manager of Vehicle Maintenance, had gone into the most recent round of budget meetings with a request for a large budget increase. When Preston asked him to justify such a large increase, Baker pointed to an aging bus fleet and rising labor costs owing to higher mechanic salaries and increased repair times. Senior management then asked Baker to put together the numbers to support his request, so they could better understand his situation. After the meeting, Baker re-evaluated his budget requests and decided

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that they were not high priorities. Besides, he knew that his mechanics had always been able to make do with what they received and that they could do so again if necessary. Only about thirty- five years of age, Baker, like Preston, had advanced significantly since coming to Express just four years earlier.

Preston later explained that operating costs per hour of service delivery had been increasing for all divisions, but that the maintenance portion of these costs was rising at a faster rate. He also explained that Express had not purchased any new buses in the previous three years and that, at the same time, Express's service area was increasing. When Clayton Baker failed to return with a report to justify his requests, however, Preston believed Baker had figured out how to make ends meet.

The Transit Division divided maintenance work among its four bases, each one responsible for a specific number of buses within a well-defined service area. Base supervisors managed the day- to-day operations for the Vehicle Maintenance Division. Although they played a limited role in budget hearings, the base supervisors' ability to perform their jobs successfully with the funds allocated to them determined whether they would receive any additional compensation under the PFP plan. Fulfilling their responsibilities could be tough in years with lean resources. No matter the level of resources they received, the base supervisors still were expected to ensure that there were enough buses operating to cover the runs within their service areas.

Whenever Baker had a problem regarding performance at one of the bases, he contacted the base supervisor directly. Otherwise, for the most part, Baker remained at his downtown office. There he could easily monitor the activities at each base concerning repairs, man-hours, and costs by reviewing the reports, summary statistics, and other data that were generated by a technologically advanced computer system known as MIRS (Maintenance Information Reporting System).

Each maintenance base divided the work across three eight-hour shifts. Mechanics performed all repairs and maintenance functions at each base. Their immediate supervisor was the lead mechanic, who acted as the foreman for a team of five to seven mechanics. Lead mechanics reported to a chief. There was one chief per eight-hour shift, whose responsibility was to decide what work received priority. The lead mechanics assigned the repair work to individual mechanics after receiving the priorities from the chief. Some workers complained that a great deal of favoritism was shown in this process, in that select individuals always received the easier tasks.

Chiefs were the first-level managers in the maintenance division. Most were in their mid-50s, and were predominantly ex-mechanics who "crossed the line" into management. One chief, in describing her responsibilities, said, "The chief's job is to carry through on projects, to get information transmitted on through. A chief is the base supervisor's go-fer." It was a very demanding job, she added, but mechanics didn't perceive it that way. "Mechanics don't view chiefs as overworked. Some mechanics think chiefs just sit around and drink coffee."

Each shift also had one or two inspectors who reported to the shift chief. Inspectors were former mechanics and generally had a very good understanding of the mechanical components they

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were asked to inspect. During routine inspections, the inspectors used a checklist to monitor bus condition and identify potential hazards. After conducting an inspection, the inspector signed the checklist to verify that he had indeed inspected each item and noted its condition. If a deficiency was so bad as to represent a threat to passengers in its current state, the inspector could "Bad Order" (BO) the bus. According to Express policy, "Bad Ordered" buses had to be repaired before returning to service.

The traditional adversarial mode prevailed in labor-management relations. While the work of the mechanics was relentless, their union, Local 231 of the United Transportation Employees Union, ensured that they were treated equitably with respect to salaries and benefits. Newly hired mechanics progressed upwards in salary during their first three years before reaching the top pay bracket at the end of the third year. From that point on until they retired, mechanics received only a Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA), unless they obtained a promotion to lead mechanic, inspector, or chief.

Most mechanics had been with Express for a long time, and retirement was the primary form of exit from the mechanic ranks. While the newer mechanics, who were fewer in number, usually strove to do a good job, the common feeling among many veterans was that they only needed to do enough to get by and thus avoid being fired.

One chief who rose up from the mechanic ranks attributed this attitude to two factors: Lack of employee recognition and accountability. "There are no sanctions or recognition, no positives for hard work," he said. "Management can put a written commendation in your file, but it doesn't happen much; and it's done with no fanfare, no publicity, no money."

The only recognition maintenance personnel received was for their number of years in service at Express - mechanics received lapel pins showing years of service and, after twenty years, a coffee-and-cake ceremony. In contrast, bus operators received regular recognition of their contributions to the organization's service delivery. In fact, there were even "Driver Appreciation" days to reinforce their can-do attitude.

Regarding accountability, the chief said, "There is no accountability for getting the job done right. A coach can come back for the same problem over and over, and no one holds the mechanic accountable for getting it fixed. It is the lead's responsibility to follow up on problems, but it is not done."

There also was a problem with mechanics' lack of respect towards Express equipment, which frequently was abused and, consequently, often broken. Waste was another problem. For example, mechanics would go through can after can of brake cleaner rather than steam clean a coach before doing repairs. In a system as large as Express, it was virtually impossible for the leads and chiefs to see all that was going on. In fact, chiefs were convinced that maintenance employees regularly stole smaller items during their shifts.

To deal with any disciplinary problems, Express used a "positive performance counseling" (PPC) program. The "counseling" was done by a chief who received two four-hour training courses and a program manual. No one could be dismissed without a PPC. The process consisted

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of three warnings, two of which were verbal. The third was written and could lead to an employee's being fired. In reality, however, management used the PPC program very little because of unwillingness to spend the time required to document disciplinary actions or to buck strong union support for disciplined employees. Union representatives had expressed serious concerns about the fairness and objectivity of discipline being meted out.

"Because of the union, people feel safe," said one chief. "People are fired and the union brings them back. We appreciate the benefits of the union, but there are big problems too."

Together, the three chiefs at each base decided which buses would be repaired on any given day or throughout the week. The chiefs were given a great deal of discretion in determining the priority of repairs - so long as each work order submitted was completed and they maintained an adequate number of buses to make the runs. In addition, the base supervisor continually stressed the need for efficiency in all maintenance tasks. That required a great deal of coordination among the chiefs, as a majority of the work required more than one shift to complete; but the necessary coordination was not always present.

For example, if repairs required more than one shift, a bus was simply left on the hoist for the incoming shift. The preceding shift mechanics, however, seldom left information to indicate where they had left off in the repair process, or even what the problem was that they were trying to repair. That created friction among the shifts, as well as delays in the repair time required to fix a coach.

Further, if the next crew's chief did not agree with the repair priorities decided upon at the weekly chiefs' meeting, he would roll the bus off the hoist at the beginning of the shift and direct the leads to assign repairs for other buses he thought were more important. This led to additional conflict among the chiefs and the shifts, each believing that the other shift was not doing its "fair share" of the repairs.

This practice of bypassing buses that were on the hoists at the beginning of a shift was adopted by the individual mechanics, as well. A mechanic might roll a bus off a hoist and find other repairs to do simply because the repairs required for the initial bus were complicated or distasteful.

The primary goal of the base supervisor and each chief was to ensure that enough buses were available to handle the runs scheduled for each day. That meant they had to monitor the "float" very carefully. The float was the difference between the number of buses allotted to a base and the number required to cover all the runs for which a base was responsible, in effect a reserve. If there was an insufficient float, preventative maintenance and other repairs removed too many buses from service and the chief was unable to provide the number of buses needed to make runs.

To monitor the maintenance and repair requirements (and hence, the float) of the individual bases, Express relied on its MIRS computer system. While several other transit operations around the country refused even to deal with the system because it was "too complicated and difficult to use," MIRS was implemented at Express with powerful support from Transit Director

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Frank Preston. MIRS had been in place for about nine months. When the system was installed, each base had a one-week training course on how to use it. The "can-do" attitude at Express played a large role in getting MIRS up and running.

Another fan of the computer system was Clayton Baker, who had been a quantitative analyst in the private sector before coming to Express. Baker said MIRS provided information never before available, including labor performance statistics, failure monitoring, a log of the types of defects reported, work order monitoring, and a complete maintenance record for each coach. The impetus behind MIRS was management's desire for a complete package of all Express maintenance information, which could be used to help project maintenance requirements for the upcoming year's budget.

MIRS compiled the maintenance information from work orders entered into the computer. Work orders were initiated four ways:

Operator Request: A bus driver noted a problem on a bus and turned in an Operator Request.

Shop Request: Shop personnel, such as a mechanic, noted a problem on a coach while it was in the yard and issued a Shop Request.

Trouble Call: A coach broke down while on a route, and the repairs necessary to get the bus back on the road were initiated via a Trouble Call work order.

Preventative Maintenance: The bulk of all repair requests, however, originated from inspectors who identified problems during routine bus inspections and prepared a Preventative Maintenance work order. These included instances where inspectors issued "Bad Orders" to prevent a bus from returning to service until the deficiency was repaired. The work orders submitted by the inspectors were a constant source of additional work for the chiefs and the base supervisors to deal with.

To ensure the accuracy of the information compiled by MIRS, the system was equipped with a two-level security access. Mechanics and base supervisors only had "read capabilities" on MIRS. That meant they could get information from MIRS, but they could not alter the information on the computer files.

Chiefs, lead mechanics, and some clerks had "read and write capabilities" on MIRS. These individuals could access information and input information or alter the files on the computer. Employees with "read and write" access had individual passwords, so they could gain access to MIRS.

Once a work order was entered into the computer, it could be removed in one of only three ways:

Entry of a completion notice. The ID number of the mechanic who did the work was entered alongside a completion-notice entry. The lead mechanics were responsible for entering this information, but only after they completed a visual inspection or verification of the repairs.

Entry of the "Repaired By Other Item" (RBOI) code. RBOI referred to the fact that the repairs were actually completed as required, but the work was indicated on another work

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order. This process was used to eliminate duplicate work orders generated by different sources. The chiefs used the RBOI code when sorting through work orders and preparing the work distribution for their shifts.

3. Entry of a default employee number. At North Base (the base highlighted in the newspaper article), the employee default number was 00005 and appeared on numerous work orders. The default number was used for new employees who completed repairs during their first few days on the job and did not yet have an identification number.

Entering MIRS data accounted for most of the lead mechanics' and chiefs' time on each shift. Consequently, they seldom got around to observing the mechanics at work. In fact, pressured chiefs sometimes used RBOI codes to eliminate backlogged repair work if they believed the repair was not necessary. Consequently, there were instances where a work order was recorded as RBOI, but no repair actually took place. In addition, on most RBOIs, there was no reference to the other, supposedly duplicate, work order.

North Base

The work load in the Maintenance Division, combined with the necessity of maintaining enough buses to meet service demands, often generated tension among the inspectors, chiefs, and base supervisors. These tensions were especially apparent at - although not restricted to - North Base, the base cited in the newspaper article as having the worst maintenance problems.

Tom Rogers was the North Base supervisor. Rogers had risen through the ranks in Express Maintenance and had been with the organization for twenty-seven years. He was keenly aware of the details of the maintenance work done at his base. On the floor, some workers described Rogers as "impatient," saying he often displayed a "bad attitude." One mechanic, while agreeing with these perceptions, said that Rogers' image resulted from the extreme pressures he encountered as base supervisor.

Two years before, North Base had fallen behind in its workload and could not accomplish all the repairs noted on work orders. Management had solved the problem by transferring mechanics from other bases. Rogers was determined not to let that happen again. He knew, perhaps better than anyone else, exactly how much mileage could be obtained from a coach before maintenance became absolutely necessary. Consequently, inspectors said Rogers told them to ignore various items on the different inspection cards, in order to do the inspections more quickly, but to sign the inspection card indicating everything listed had been accomplished. Rogers also asked inspectors not to "Bad Order" certain deficiencies, even if they appeared during the course of an inspection.

About six months before the newspaper article appeared, James Hensley, the inspector quoted in the article, had brought the situation to the attention of the union's Vice President, Fred Lowder. Lowder had outlined Hensley's concerns in a letter to Vehicle Maintenance Manager Clayton Baker and requested a meeting.

Nearly a month later, Baker replied by letter that he had reaffirmed the current policies with the base supervisors, "and they, in turn, with the chiefs, leads, and other Vehicle Maintenance staff." He confirmed that, "all items on the inspection cards are to be inspected. A mechanic should

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never intentionally not inspect an item on a card... Inspectors should BO any defect they find that is, in their judgment, in need of repair." But inspectors also "should limit their inspections to the items on the card for the inspection step scheduled."

However, inspectors said they continued to feel pressure to curtail the lists of defects and neglect specific deficiencies. Hensley finally concluded that the formal system was not going to resolve the situation, so he decided to meet with Centerville Globe reporter Ron Mendez to discuss the problem. Supported by anonymous reports from other employees, the allegations against Express made their way to the front page of the Centerville Globe on that Saturday in September.

Martin Jiles sat back in his chair after returning home and reading the paper. He contemplated calling his upper-level managers but decided to wait until later in the day to ensure they each had time to see the newspaper story. While he doubted all the allegations were true, he knew one thing for sure - he had a problem.

Exhibit 1:

ARE EXPRESS BUSES UNSAFE? Drivers, mechanics say bosses falsify maintenance records by Ron Mendez Globe staff reporter

Express supervisors have doctored maintenance reports to conceal decisions allowing unsafe and environment-damaging buses on the streets of Progress County, bus drivers and mechanics allege.

The transit workers, many of whom requested anonymity because they fear for their jobs, also allege that Express management has pressured them to falsify inspection reports.

Backed by transit-union officials, they accuse Express of suppressing dissent through harassment and intimidation - including threats of dismissal and assignment to the "brake room," where mechanics must work alone in hot and cumbersome safety gear to protect themselves from exposure to cancer-causing asbestos.

Numerous sources said Express has adopted a covert policy of allowing buses to leak oil because that is cheaper than it is to repair them. They estimated that Express buses leak 1,000 gallons of oil a day.

Jerry McMann, president of Local 231 of the United Transportation Employees Union, said the sources' allegations are supported by an overwhelming majority of the 2,950 members.

Express, in response to orders from the state Department of Environment, says it is studying ways to reduce the amount of oil that its buses leak. The department issued a compliance order against Express on July 25, primarily because oil and grease pollution from the transit system's Westview maintenance yard and Annex was contaminating Turnmill Creek.

Workers and union representatives said maintenance problems are the worst at Express's Northside Base and annex. They said at that yard, a "phantom mechanic" - the common nickname for a computer code number that represents a supervisory mechanic who does not exist

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- has frequently overruled the "bad order" directives of front-line inspectors to keep unsafe or mechanically defective buses off the streets.

The workers contend that the phantom mechanic was conceived so supervisors could avoid individual liability, should one of the buses found faulty by an inspector be involved in an accident after a supervisor sent it out. McMann noted that only a supervisor can approve a bus for service after a line inspector has ordered it kept off the road.

"That's where the phantom mechanic comes in. When nobody is willing to OKS (OK for service) something, it goes into the computer as 00005 (code number)," McMann said. Only supervisors have access to the computer, he added.

Tom Rogers, Express's top maintenance supervisor on the Northside, was reported to be attending a management conference in San Diego and could not be reached for comment.

Clayton Baker, Express's manager of vehicle safety, said the number was intended as a catchall to be used temporarily by new supervisors who had not been assigned a permanent identification number under a computer program adopted the first of the year. He said some lower level managers, however, misunderstood its use and mistakenly used the number as a matter of convenience. He said that with a few rare exceptions misuse of the number was stopped in July. "I don't think we've got a problem there and no abuse of it," he said.

Baker dismissed the accusations of the union and workers as the unfounded claims of overzealous drivers and mechanics.

He said Express's safety record is superb and that the small number of accidents is proof that safety has not been compromised.

The Express workers counter that they have several concerns about the impact of inadequate maintenance on the safety of the system's buses, especially repeated instances in which buses were put on the road with brakes that front-line inspectors said were faulty.

"Where is the evidence?" Baker said. In the last five years, there could have been no more than one accident that could be attributed to brake failure, he said.

Express workers and union officials, however, said at least three accidents involving passengers can be blamed on bad brakes during that period. Express disputed one case. Another is undisputed. In the third case, Express's finding that a driver was at fault was overruled by a Superior Court judge after testimony that the brakes were faulty.

More important, the workers said, maintenance and safety problems are getting worse as defects are left unattended. Said one, "They've been lucky so far, but it's catching up with them."

Added a driver: "There's a bus I got just recently that was B.O.'d (bad ordered) before I got it. Four drivers wrote it up for loss of power. It would die on the street with traffic coming. In a

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one-month span, it was continually written up and continually put on the road." Drivers finally refused to take the vehicle off the lot, he said.

The basic allegations and some of the specifics behind them include: buses that mechanics, drivers, and inspectors assert have serious safety problems - including bad brakes, engines that stall in traffic, fuel leaks, and faulty sensor alarms that alert drivers when a passenger is caught in a rear door - are sent out on runs after front-line decisions are overruled by superiors, including the phantom mechanic. Said one Northside mechanic, "Probably, on any given day there are ten buses out there that are severely unsafe, in my opinion."

Said another, "Almost daily, drivers leave the yard with bad-ordered coaches, everything from brakes to light bulbs." Express has 1,076 buses and trolleys in regular service.

In the most recent confrontation, an inspector who ordered five buses held for brake problems early this month was overruled by a shift supervisor. The inspector, James Hensley, then contacted his immediate supervisor, lead man Don Byrd, who agreed with the original decision in three of the five cases.

Byrd, according to Baker, then contacted the Express safety department in an attempt to get an independent assessment of the condition of the brakes. However, instead of responding to the complaint, the chief of Express's safety unit contacted Baker, who stood by the decision of the shift supervisor at a meeting Baker described as cordial but Hensley said was intimidating.

Baker acknowledged that he confronted Hensley at the meeting about contacting the media to protest Express maintenance policies, calling Hensley misinformed and declaring that he would make a fool of him.

Said Baker: "I told James that his standard was higher than Express's...As far as I'm concerned, those coaches will operate another 1,000 miles safely, when they would come in for another inspection."

Mechanics, inspectors, and lead men are pressured to ignore mechanical defects and to sign inspection reports when, in fact, all the items on the standardized inspection forms have not been reviewed. Said one worker: "It's kind of a standing joke at North Base that when you become an inspector, they give you the equipment you'll need: a pair of goggles and a flashlight - both blacked out. In other words, you see nothing."

The workers said many employees succumb to the pressure. "The vast majority of drivers feel this way, but a lot of guys don't B.O. (bad order) stuff because they figure nothing will happen," said one driver. "And those who have written them up have been told to knock it off," he added.

Baker said he has never been given evidence to support the allegations of pressure. However, Fred Lowder, vice president of Local 231, wrote Baker in April to complain that mechanics who become inspectors were "being told to ignore various items on the different inspection cards in order to do the inspections quicker. Then the mechanic has to sign the inspection card indicating

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that everything has been accomplished. Second, some mechanics are being told not to B.O. certain items."

To support his contention, Lowder attached a copy of a handwritten memo from an Express supervisor that instructed three mechanics and inspectors, including Hensley, to be less severe in judging the roadworthiness of buses. Included were instructions that only a chief or higher authority would hold a bus for brake work and that "engine oil leaks are common...Use common sense."

Also, in April, mechanic Doug Fredricks refused to attest that a bus was ready for service because a number of items on the inspection form had been marked out, according to Express documents and employees. Baker said Wednesday he would investigate the circumstances surrounding the Fredricks incident.

The workers said that other subterfuges employed by managers include stating that an item was repaired in the process of fixing something else when, in fact, it was not. Said a mechanic, "Sometimes they just steam clean an engine and say it (an oil leak) was repaired. I can take you to those same buses right now and I guarantee you those oil leaks are still there. I see those buses almost every day."

At other times, the sources said supervisors simply say there was no trouble in the first place. Said Hensley, "They've quit bothering me. So now I inspect a bus and write it up. Then they fig what they want and they send it out. It's that easy."

Over the objections of transit workers, buses with severe mechanical defects; especially oil and fuel leaks, are routinely put on a special "tripper" list that is supposed to confine the buses to short one-time runs. The workers said the buses, which they said leak as much as ten quarts of oil a day, often are used many times a day and that the defects are not fixed for months, if ever. Express documents, supplied by workers who said they were examples of common practice, indicate that buses with fuel and oil leaks dating back at least as far as June were on the tripper list early this month.

Workers said conditions are so severe at South Base, near Jarvis Pavilion, that workers were slipping on the grounds. It is worse at the Westview Annex, they agreed.

Express maintenance managers have punished, and threatened to punish, workers who refuse to comply with their wishes. Several sources said they have been threatened with dismissal. Others said they believe they were assigned to less-than-desirable duty because they refused to go along. Most recently, management, in April, attempted to remove Hensley from his duties as an inspector because he was "calling things that do not need to be replaced or repaired," according to a memo from an Express supervisor. Hensley was reinstated after he filed a union grievance.

"James's case is the clearest case of harassment and intimidation, but we've certainly seen it before," the union's McMann said. "But let me assure you," he added, "that James is not the only one who feels that this is unreasonable, ridiculous, and unfair."

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"There is not a pattern of harassment," Baker replied. He said the allegation has been made before but that the union has been unable to substantiate it when asked for proof. Baker said lower-level managers in isolated instances may unwisely threaten retaliation against workers, "but I know they have been counseled not to do it."

Several workers independently volunteered that the reason employees have not spoken out is that they have been threatened by a written Express policy that states it is a punishable infraction to make "derogatory comments concerning Express equipment and/or management in public." Baker said he was unaware of the policy, which, he said after consulting an Express policy manual, originated in another division, Express operations.

Many of the employees said that they were very upset about the environmental consequences of what they insisted is an unwritten Express policy of allowing buses that leak oil to keep running because it is cheaper than fixing them. The mechanics said they were told Express pays 38 cents for a quart of oil, while it typically costs hundreds of dollars to repair a serious oil leak. Just as important, they said, managers under pressure to keep buses on the road are reluctant to take a coach out of service for several days of repairs.

"They're right. Oil is cheaper. But that doesn't mean it's cheaper for the streams and rivers," said equipment service worker Ernie Hall.

Said a source from the Westview yard: "It's a waste of time to complain. Instead of getting the oil leaks fixed, they just keep running them. Walk through this yard. It's an eyesore, a total disgrace. There's oil all over. I've seen it wash down to the river (Turnmill Creek) when it rains. It's a regular oil slick out here."

Other workers said air pollution also is a problem. Several said a thick, blue cloud of exhaust fumes literally hovers over Express maintenance bases when buses are warmed up en masse on winter mornings.

"There has been a historical problem out there," said Environment Department inspector Bob Holdman. Holdman said he has ordered comprehensive water-quality tests because the last tests of Turnmill Creek taken near the Northside Express complex were taken during the area's near- record dry spell this summer and still showed that the water contained higher than allowable limits of fats, oil, and grease. Holdman said that unless Express takes immediate corrective action he would anticipate much higher contamination readings after the first heavy rainfall. Holdman's supervisor, Jeff Davis, who said he was shocked - in just a casual observation - to see buses leaking oil on the Westview lot, said Express will face a stiff fine if it contaminates Turnmill Creek again.

"I think we need to re-evaluate some of our criteria in evaluating ecological damage as well as mechanical damage," Baker said. "And that is happening."