The required is what is in yellow

In December 2012, Antonio Ortega, the owner of Bebida Sol, had just finished reading a report done by his general manager, Pedro Cortez, about the possible investment in a new product line, Hola-Kola. The idea of Hola-Kola came about three months earlier when Antonio attended a seminar on youth obesity organized by a local high school that his two children attended. Even though he had often heard of the rising obesity problem in Mexico, Antonio was still very disturbed by the statistics indicating how the obesity rate in Mexico had tripled since 1980, and that 69.5% of the people 15 years and older were either obese or overweight. Even more shocking to Antonio, based on this statistic, Mexico now had the highest overweight rate in the world, surpassing the United States.' After the seminar, Antonio discussed the idea of Hola-Kola, a low-price, zero-calorie carbonated soft drink, with Pedro Cortez. Pedro was excited about the idea, and liked the opportunity to launch something new, espe- cially given that the company had not introduced a new product in the last five years. However, Pedro thought a market study should be done to gauge the potential demand before the firm undertook the investment. Company Background Bebida Sol is a small, privately owned carbonated soft drink company based in Puebla, Mexico. A retired ex- ecutive from a popular fast-food restaurant chain, Roberto Ortega, founded it in 1998. During his career as a restaurant executive, Roberto learned that Mexicans, regardless of social status, loved their soda pop. Many would drink soda to quench their thirst on a regular basis, due to the lack of hygienic, drinkable water. With the influx of international brands of soda pop, Mexico now had the highest consumption of carbonated soft drinks per capita in the world. The average per capita consumption was 40% higher than the United States, at 163 liters (43 gallons) per year, while the United States consumed 118 liters (31 gallons), according to statistics presented by the international organization Oxfam and the Mexican NGO Consumer's Power. Due to the high obesity problem, health and consumer groups in Mexico had demanded that the government impose a 20% tax on soft drinks, claiming that it would not only reduce consumption, but the tax revenue could also be used to fight health problems that soft drinks generated. 999- Exhibit 1. Rates of Overweight and Obesity Persons by Country (2010) Overweight Obesity 31 Jepun (2001 Korea 2001 2001 46 2000) 46 MOI 2018 44 30 Sve 2001 45 Dwme 2000 47 Nech 2009 48 A 2000 45 48 2001 Beim 2009 52 Portugu (0) FO2000 50 OCCO Gum200 Slovenia (2007) S2000 Cech Rep. 2008 2009 59 12000 2000 Lugo 2007 Che 2005 Island Canada) Unawddomos 20071 New 2017 70 Mei (2005) 68 Unted States 2000 34 In 2001 001) wa 2001 2005 Pewien 2015 50 E000 South A 2005 80 60 40 20 0 10 20 30 40 %of adult population %of adult population Source: "World Obesity Stats 2010 and Beyond." Douglas Robb, Sept. 27, 2010, Health News. Peg 888 The market leaders for carbonated soft drinks in Mexico were Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Dr. Pepper Snapple. and Grupo Penafiel. Together, they accounted for a combined market share of more than 90%, with Coca Cola being the major player. The Mexican soft drink market (products include bottled water, carbonates, RTD tea! coffee, functional drinks, fruit/vegetable juices, and other soft drinks) had total revenues of $39.2bn in 2011. representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.3% between 2007 and 2011. Market consumption volumes increased with a CAGR of 4.5% between 2007 and 2011, reaching a total of 49.3 billion liters in 2011.4 Roberto thought these popular international brands commanded prices that might be out of reach for the poorer segment of the population. To capture this market, he started the company to offer private-labeled carbonated soft drinks with similar tastes, but at about half the price. His products consisted of regular cola carbonates and non-cola carbonates, such as lemon/lime or orange carbonates. Bebida Sol's products were sold only in small independent grocery stores and convenience stores in Mexico. The firm avoided the supermarkets and hypermarkets because it could not sustain the desired margin in these large stores. Moreover, most of the consumers, especially the middle-to-low income ones, shopped at small, independent grocery stores. To create awareness, the owners of these independent stores were given incentives to personally promote the products. Sales increased dramatically, from 80 million pesos in 1998 to about 900 million pesos in 2011. 6.00% In 2007. Antonio Ortega, Roberto's only son, took over the business when Roberto unexpectedly passed way. Antonio started working on the sales side of the business two years before his father's death. He had gath- ered a few valuable tips on how to run the business from his father, which had made him a rather conservative businessman A year after Antonio took over the business, the global financial crisis hit. The economic downturn in Mexico actually benefitted the low-price soda business. Demand increased dramatically as many commumers became price conscious and switched from international brands to private labels. Bebida Sol's sales increased by 60% from 2008 to 2009, and continued to increase without the firm changing any of its business strategy or practices. The company's return on sales (net profit margin) also had been increasing in the last few years. Exhibit 2. Bebida Sols Sales and Return on Sales $1,000,000 5:57 5.34% $900,000 $800,000 $700,000 $600,000 $500,000 $400,000 $300,000 $200,000 $100,000 5.00% 4.21% 1.00% Sales (throunds of pesos 3.00 Return of stes) 2.00 1 00 $0 0.00% 2009 2010 2011 Sales Return on Sales The Proposal Reading once again the executive summary of the report, Antonio recalled what his father told him several times during the two years he was working with him: "Don't grow the company for the sake of growing Invest only when you are confident there is sufficient demand for a new product, and also when you have the financial resources As far as financial resources, Antonio felt the timing could not be better. Due to strong sales and profitability in the last few years, Bebida Sol had accumulated a sizable amount of cash. With solid financial performance and steady cash flows, his banker had agreed to extend him a five-year, 16% annual interest term loan to launch Hola-Kola. In the proposal, Pedro Cortez estimated that with 20% of the needed capital borrowed, the 20/80 debt-equity structure would result in an 18.2% weighted average cost of capital for this project. The bigger question lingering in Antonio's mind was whether there would be sufficient demand for this new, zero-calorie product line. Even though the demand for low-calorie sodas had increased in Mexico, they seemed to be consumed mainly by the middle-to-upper income segment of the population. The majority of the lower.income people still consumed only the regular, high-sugared carbonated soft drinks. It wasn't clear whether this was because the low.income group lacked the awareness of the obesity problem, or because there were not too many low-priced, low-calorie soda options available. If it were the former , the outlook for low. price, low-calorie carbonated soft drinks might not be too promising at this time. If it were the latter, it might be the perfect timing for Bebida Sol to introduce Hola-Kola. Pedro hired a consultant to do a market study right after Antonio discussed the idea of Hola-Kola with him. The consultant estimated that the company could sell a total of 600,000 liters of these tero-calorie carbonates a month, at a projected price of five pesos a liter. This volume of sales was expected for a period of five years at the same price. The market study took about two months to complete and cost the company five million pesos, which Pedro had paid shortly after its completion. Since the existing bottling plant was running at 100% capacity producing regularsodas, the proposal called for a fleet of new, semi-automated bottling and kegging machines designed for long, high-quality runs. The total cost of these machines, including installation, was estimated to be 50 million pesos. This amount could be fully depreciated on a straight-line basis over a period of five years. Pedro believed that the purchase of these machines would enable Bebida Sol to reduce its cost of labor and therefore the price to the customers, putting the firm in a more competitive position. With proper maintenance, these machines could produce at least 600.000 liters of carbonated drinks per month. Pedro also estimated that these machines would have a resale value of four million pesos in five years time, if the company were to either shut down the production of Hola-Kola, or replace these machines with fully automated ones at that time. The new machines would be housed in an unoccupied annex by the main production facility of Bebida Sol. The annex was also large enough to store the finished products before they were shipped out to grocery stores. Antonio's father built the annex years ago when he planned to venture into the mineral water business. He died before he could execute his plan. The annex had been vacant ever since, even though Antonio recently received an offer to lease out the space for 60,000 pesos a year. Pedro determined that additional working capital was needed to ensure smooth production and sales of this new product line. He proposed keeping raw materials inventory at a level equal to one month of produc- tion. To encourage the independent grocery stores to carry the new product line, he proposed offering a longer collection period, letting the grocers pay in 45 days, instead of the normal 30 days. As far as accounts payable, he would follow the company's normal policy, and settle the accounts in 36 days The proposal also outlined the various estimates of production and overhead costs, and selling expenses. Raw materials needed to produce the sodas were estimated to be 1.8 pesos per liter, while labor costs and energy costs per month were estimated to be 180,000 pesos and 50,000 pesos, respectively. The incremental general administrative and selling expenses were quite modest, estimated to be 300.000 a year, as the new product could be sold by Bebida Sol's current sales force and via existing distribution channels. The accounting department typically charged 1% of sales as overhead costs for any new projects. Glancing back at his notes, Antonio started pondering. The market study seemed to indicate sufficient demand for the new product line. What he really feared was that the new zero-calorie carbonates might erode the sales of his existing products-the regular sodas. The market study suggested that potential erosion could cost the firm as much as 800,000 pesos of after-tax cash flows per year. At the new tax rate of 30% for both income and capital gains, could he add value to the firm by taking on this project? Appendix 1. Webida Sol-Income Statements for the Year Ending December 31 (thousands of pesos) Income Item Sales COGS Gross margin Marketing & Selling Expenses General Administrative Expenses EBITDA 2009 642,400 100.0% 349.884 51.5% 292,516 45.5% 2010 832.341 100.0% 456.409 54,89 375.932 45.29 2011 900,101 100.0 487,0205119 413.081 45.9% 120.359 18.796 65340 10.29 106,817 1669 150.322 88,622 136.988 18.1% 10.6% 16.5% 168 330 18.7% 92.791 10.94 146,960 16.3% Depreciation EBIT 45.046 61,771 7.0% 9.6% 59.441 77.544 ZAS 65.985 7:39 80.975 9.09 Interest 23.120 38,651 6.0% 14.088 63.456 7.6% 9.140 1.00 71,635 8.0% Taxes @ 30% Net Income 11.595 27.056 1.89 1.2 19.037 46619 239 539 21.491 50,145 2.49 5.696 Dividends Retained Earnings 20,000 7,056 20,000 24.419 20,000 30,145 Appendix 2. Bebida Sol-Balance Sheet as of December 31 (thousands of pesos) Assets 2009 2010 Cash 12.023 3.196 36,090 Accounts Receivable 61,600 15.7% 75.253 Inventory 32.592 8.3% 45.016 Prepaid Expenses 11.792 3,0% 20,660 Current Assets 118,007 30.196 177,019 8996 18.6% 11.196 5.19 43.89 2011 53,020 14.0% 78.913 20.896 60,044 15.89 15.117 4.04 207,09354.5% Gross fixed assets Accum depreciation Ner fixed assets 439.230 112.09 165.046 42.1% 274.184 69.996 452,020 111.796 224.490 55.5% 2276530 56.296 463,122 122.096 290.475 76.59 172.647 55% Total Assets 392 191 100.0% 404549 100.0% 379,740 100.0% Liabilities & Net Worth Accounts Payable Accrued expenses Short-term debt Current Liabilities 2009 34,509 15,083 3.8% 70,520 18.06 120,112 30.6% 2010 43,765 10.896 19,087 4.7% 63.429 15. 126,281 31.29 2011 48,035 12.6% 20,493 5.496 22.200 6.0% 91,428 24.19 Long-term debt Equity 45,023 11.596 227,056 579 6.6% 26,793 251.475 6,693 1.8% 28161974.19 Libilities - Ner Worth 392A191 100.0% 4045.19 100.0 379740 100.096 Replacement Project - 5 years Year 0 1 3 4 5 L. Initial Investment Outlay Cost of new asset Shipping & Installation Incr. in net working capital Net cash flow from sale of old asset (See Asset Replaced Cash Flow Schedule) Initial investment 0 1. Supplemental Operating Cash Flow 0 Tax Rate A Operating Costs Savings Positivel A Depreciation (Set depr schedule) A Earnings before taxes (EBT) A Income Taxes (XEBT ANet income Add back depreciation Supplemental operating cash flow II. Terminal Cash Flow OOOOOO OOOO. o o o o o o o o o o o o OD Return of net working capital Net salvage value of new asset (See salvage val schedule) Net salvage value of old asset-Opporunity cost Terminal cash flow IV. Incremental Cash Flows Total incremental cash flow per period 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.00 IRR UNUMI NPV. Req. Returns Depreciation Schedule Salvare Valve Schedule Depreciation Schedule Salvare Value Schedule 1. Depreciable bass calculation Asser purchase price Shipping & Installation Other capitalizable Depreciable basis OOOO 1. Book value Yes Asset purchase price Shipping & Installation Other capitalizable Depreciable basis Accumulated Depr Yr. 5 Book Value Yr. 5 IL Tax Depreciation Schedule Ann. Der Year Year 2 Year Year 4 Years Old asset depr. ( per yr.) 1. Tax Effect of Sale Selling price of asset YS Book value Yr 5 Gain (los) Income taxes DOBO Asset Replaced Cash Flow Schedule 0 III. Net Salvage Value Cash flow from sale Tax effect of sale Net cash flow from salvage 0 0 Tax Effect of Sale Selling Price Old Asset Book Value Yr. Gain Loss Income taxes 0 II. Net Salvage Value Cash flow from sale Tax effect of Sale Net cash flow from salvage In December 2012, Antonio Ortega, the owner of Bebida Sol, had just finished reading a report done by his general manager, Pedro Cortez, about the possible investment in a new product line, Hola-Kola. The idea of Hola-Kola came about three months earlier when Antonio attended a seminar on youth obesity organized by a local high school that his two children attended. Even though he had often heard of the rising obesity problem in Mexico, Antonio was still very disturbed by the statistics indicating how the obesity rate in Mexico had tripled since 1980, and that 69.5% of the people 15 years and older were either obese or overweight. Even more shocking to Antonio, based on this statistic, Mexico now had the highest overweight rate in the world, surpassing the United States.' After the seminar, Antonio discussed the idea of Hola-Kola, a low-price, zero-calorie carbonated soft drink, with Pedro Cortez. Pedro was excited about the idea, and liked the opportunity to launch something new, espe- cially given that the company had not introduced a new product in the last five years. However, Pedro thought a market study should be done to gauge the potential demand before the firm undertook the investment. Company Background Bebida Sol is a small, privately owned carbonated soft drink company based in Puebla, Mexico. A retired ex- ecutive from a popular fast-food restaurant chain, Roberto Ortega, founded it in 1998. During his career as a restaurant executive, Roberto learned that Mexicans, regardless of social status, loved their soda pop. Many would drink soda to quench their thirst on a regular basis, due to the lack of hygienic, drinkable water. With the influx of international brands of soda pop, Mexico now had the highest consumption of carbonated soft drinks per capita in the world. The average per capita consumption was 40% higher than the United States, at 163 liters (43 gallons) per year, while the United States consumed 118 liters (31 gallons), according to statistics presented by the international organization Oxfam and the Mexican NGO Consumer's Power. Due to the high obesity problem, health and consumer groups in Mexico had demanded that the government impose a 20% tax on soft drinks, claiming that it would not only reduce consumption, but the tax revenue could also be used to fight health problems that soft drinks generated. 999- Exhibit 1. Rates of Overweight and Obesity Persons by Country (2010) Overweight Obesity 31 Jepun (2001 Korea 2001 2001 46 2000) 46 MOI 2018 44 30 Sve 2001 45 Dwme 2000 47 Nech 2009 48 A 2000 45 48 2001 Beim 2009 52 Portugu (0) FO2000 50 OCCO Gum200 Slovenia (2007) S2000 Cech Rep. 2008 2009 59 12000 2000 Lugo 2007 Che 2005 Island Canada) Unawddomos 20071 New 2017 70 Mei (2005) 68 Unted States 2000 34 In 2001 001) wa 2001 2005 Pewien 2015 50 E000 South A 2005 80 60 40 20 0 10 20 30 40 %of adult population %of adult population Source: "World Obesity Stats 2010 and Beyond." Douglas Robb, Sept. 27, 2010, Health News. Peg 888 The market leaders for carbonated soft drinks in Mexico were Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Dr. Pepper Snapple. and Grupo Penafiel. Together, they accounted for a combined market share of more than 90%, with Coca Cola being the major player. The Mexican soft drink market (products include bottled water, carbonates, RTD tea! coffee, functional drinks, fruit/vegetable juices, and other soft drinks) had total revenues of $39.2bn in 2011. representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.3% between 2007 and 2011. Market consumption volumes increased with a CAGR of 4.5% between 2007 and 2011, reaching a total of 49.3 billion liters in 2011.4 Roberto thought these popular international brands commanded prices that might be out of reach for the poorer segment of the population. To capture this market, he started the company to offer private-labeled carbonated soft drinks with similar tastes, but at about half the price. His products consisted of regular cola carbonates and non-cola carbonates, such as lemon/lime or orange carbonates. Bebida Sol's products were sold only in small independent grocery stores and convenience stores in Mexico. The firm avoided the supermarkets and hypermarkets because it could not sustain the desired margin in these large stores. Moreover, most of the consumers, especially the middle-to-low income ones, shopped at small, independent grocery stores. To create awareness, the owners of these independent stores were given incentives to personally promote the products. Sales increased dramatically, from 80 million pesos in 1998 to about 900 million pesos in 2011. 6.00% In 2007. Antonio Ortega, Roberto's only son, took over the business when Roberto unexpectedly passed way. Antonio started working on the sales side of the business two years before his father's death. He had gath- ered a few valuable tips on how to run the business from his father, which had made him a rather conservative businessman A year after Antonio took over the business, the global financial crisis hit. The economic downturn in Mexico actually benefitted the low-price soda business. Demand increased dramatically as many commumers became price conscious and switched from international brands to private labels. Bebida Sol's sales increased by 60% from 2008 to 2009, and continued to increase without the firm changing any of its business strategy or practices. The company's return on sales (net profit margin) also had been increasing in the last few years. Exhibit 2. Bebida Sols Sales and Return on Sales $1,000,000 5:57 5.34% $900,000 $800,000 $700,000 $600,000 $500,000 $400,000 $300,000 $200,000 $100,000 5.00% 4.21% 1.00% Sales (throunds of pesos 3.00 Return of stes) 2.00 1 00 $0 0.00% 2009 2010 2011 Sales Return on Sales The Proposal Reading once again the executive summary of the report, Antonio recalled what his father told him several times during the two years he was working with him: "Don't grow the company for the sake of growing Invest only when you are confident there is sufficient demand for a new product, and also when you have the financial resources As far as financial resources, Antonio felt the timing could not be better. Due to strong sales and profitability in the last few years, Bebida Sol had accumulated a sizable amount of cash. With solid financial performance and steady cash flows, his banker had agreed to extend him a five-year, 16% annual interest term loan to launch Hola-Kola. In the proposal, Pedro Cortez estimated that with 20% of the needed capital borrowed, the 20/80 debt-equity structure would result in an 18.2% weighted average cost of capital for this project. The bigger question lingering in Antonio's mind was whether there would be sufficient demand for this new, zero-calorie product line. Even though the demand for low-calorie sodas had increased in Mexico, they seemed to be consumed mainly by the middle-to-upper income segment of the population. The majority of the lower.income people still consumed only the regular, high-sugared carbonated soft drinks. It wasn't clear whether this was because the low.income group lacked the awareness of the obesity problem, or because there were not too many low-priced, low-calorie soda options available. If it were the former , the outlook for low. price, low-calorie carbonated soft drinks might not be too promising at this time. If it were the latter, it might be the perfect timing for Bebida Sol to introduce Hola-Kola. Pedro hired a consultant to do a market study right after Antonio discussed the idea of Hola-Kola with him. The consultant estimated that the company could sell a total of 600,000 liters of these tero-calorie carbonates a month, at a projected price of five pesos a liter. This volume of sales was expected for a period of five years at the same price. The market study took about two months to complete and cost the company five million pesos, which Pedro had paid shortly after its completion. Since the existing bottling plant was running at 100% capacity producing regularsodas, the proposal called for a fleet of new, semi-automated bottling and kegging machines designed for long, high-quality runs. The total cost of these machines, including installation, was estimated to be 50 million pesos. This amount could be fully depreciated on a straight-line basis over a period of five years. Pedro believed that the purchase of these machines would enable Bebida Sol to reduce its cost of labor and therefore the price to the customers, putting the firm in a more competitive position. With proper maintenance, these machines could produce at least 600.000 liters of carbonated drinks per month. Pedro also estimated that these machines would have a resale value of four million pesos in five years time, if the company were to either shut down the production of Hola-Kola, or replace these machines with fully automated ones at that time. The new machines would be housed in an unoccupied annex by the main production facility of Bebida Sol. The annex was also large enough to store the finished products before they were shipped out to grocery stores. Antonio's father built the annex years ago when he planned to venture into the mineral water business. He died before he could execute his plan. The annex had been vacant ever since, even though Antonio recently received an offer to lease out the space for 60,000 pesos a year. Pedro determined that additional working capital was needed to ensure smooth production and sales of this new product line. He proposed keeping raw materials inventory at a level equal to one month of produc- tion. To encourage the independent grocery stores to carry the new product line, he proposed offering a longer collection period, letting the grocers pay in 45 days, instead of the normal 30 days. As far as accounts payable, he would follow the company's normal policy, and settle the accounts in 36 days The proposal also outlined the various estimates of production and overhead costs, and selling expenses. Raw materials needed to produce the sodas were estimated to be 1.8 pesos per liter, while labor costs and energy costs per month were estimated to be 180,000 pesos and 50,000 pesos, respectively. The incremental general administrative and selling expenses were quite modest, estimated to be 300.000 a year, as the new product could be sold by Bebida Sol's current sales force and via existing distribution channels. The accounting department typically charged 1% of sales as overhead costs for any new projects. Glancing back at his notes, Antonio started pondering. The market study seemed to indicate sufficient demand for the new product line. What he really feared was that the new zero-calorie carbonates might erode the sales of his existing products-the regular sodas. The market study suggested that potential erosion could cost the firm as much as 800,000 pesos of after-tax cash flows per year. At the new tax rate of 30% for both income and capital gains, could he add value to the firm by taking on this project? Appendix 1. Webida Sol-Income Statements for the Year Ending December 31 (thousands of pesos) Income Item Sales COGS Gross margin Marketing & Selling Expenses General Administrative Expenses EBITDA 2009 642,400 100.0% 349.884 51.5% 292,516 45.5% 2010 832.341 100.0% 456.409 54,89 375.932 45.29 2011 900,101 100.0 487,0205119 413.081 45.9% 120.359 18.796 65340 10.29 106,817 1669 150.322 88,622 136.988 18.1% 10.6% 16.5% 168 330 18.7% 92.791 10.94 146,960 16.3% Depreciation EBIT 45.046 61,771 7.0% 9.6% 59.441 77.544 ZAS 65.985 7:39 80.975 9.09 Interest 23.120 38,651 6.0% 14.088 63.456 7.6% 9.140 1.00 71,635 8.0% Taxes @ 30% Net Income 11.595 27.056 1.89 1.2 19.037 46619 239 539 21.491 50,145 2.49 5.696 Dividends Retained Earnings 20,000 7,056 20,000 24.419 20,000 30,145 Appendix 2. Bebida Sol-Balance Sheet as of December 31 (thousands of pesos) Assets 2009 2010 Cash 12.023 3.196 36,090 Accounts Receivable 61,600 15.7% 75.253 Inventory 32.592 8.3% 45.016 Prepaid Expenses 11.792 3,0% 20,660 Current Assets 118,007 30.196 177,019 8996 18.6% 11.196 5.19 43.89 2011 53,020 14.0% 78.913 20.896 60,044 15.89 15.117 4.04 207,09354.5% Gross fixed assets Accum depreciation Ner fixed assets 439.230 112.09 165.046 42.1% 274.184 69.996 452,020 111.796 224.490 55.5% 2276530 56.296 463,122 122.096 290.475 76.59 172.647 55% Total Assets 392 191 100.0% 404549 100.0% 379,740 100.0% Liabilities & Net Worth Accounts Payable Accrued expenses Short-term debt Current Liabilities 2009 34,509 15,083 3.8% 70,520 18.06 120,112 30.6% 2010 43,765 10.896 19,087 4.7% 63.429 15. 126,281 31.29 2011 48,035 12.6% 20,493 5.496 22.200 6.0% 91,428 24.19 Long-term debt Equity 45,023 11.596 227,056 579 6.6% 26,793 251.475 6,693 1.8% 28161974.19 Libilities - Ner Worth 392A191 100.0% 4045.19 100.0 379740 100.096 Replacement Project - 5 years Year 0 1 3 4 5 L. Initial Investment Outlay Cost of new asset Shipping & Installation Incr. in net working capital Net cash flow from sale of old asset (See Asset Replaced Cash Flow Schedule) Initial investment 0 1. Supplemental Operating Cash Flow 0 Tax Rate A Operating Costs Savings Positivel A Depreciation (Set depr schedule) A Earnings before taxes (EBT) A Income Taxes (XEBT ANet income Add back depreciation Supplemental operating cash flow II. Terminal Cash Flow OOOOOO OOOO. o o o o o o o o o o o o OD Return of net working capital Net salvage value of new asset (See salvage val schedule) Net salvage value of old asset-Opporunity cost Terminal cash flow IV. Incremental Cash Flows Total incremental cash flow per period 0 0 0 0 0 0 50.00 IRR UNUMI NPV. Req. Returns Depreciation Schedule Salvare Valve Schedule Depreciation Schedule Salvare Value Schedule 1. Depreciable bass calculation Asser purchase price Shipping & Installation Other capitalizable Depreciable basis OOOO 1. Book value Yes Asset purchase price Shipping & Installation Other capitalizable Depreciable basis Accumulated Depr Yr. 5 Book Value Yr. 5 IL Tax Depreciation Schedule Ann. Der Year Year 2 Year Year 4 Years Old asset depr. ( per yr.) 1. Tax Effect of Sale Selling price of asset YS Book value Yr 5 Gain (los) Income taxes DOBO Asset Replaced Cash Flow Schedule 0 III. Net Salvage Value Cash flow from sale Tax effect of sale Net cash flow from salvage 0 0 Tax Effect of Sale Selling Price Old Asset Book Value Yr. Gain Loss Income taxes 0 II. Net Salvage Value Cash flow from sale Tax effect of Sale Net cash flow from salvage