The Spreadsheet Wars Contributed by Jack Yurkiewicz, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, New York. Sam Ellis is worried. As president and CEO of Forward Software, Sam introduced a new spreadsheet product, Cinco, to the market last year. Forward Software has been developing and marketing high-quality software packages for more than five years, but these products are mostly computer software language interpreters, similar to Pascal, FORTRAN, and C. These products received excellent critical reviews, and because of Forward's aggressive pricing and marketing, the company quickly captured a major share of that software market. Buoyed by its wide acceptance, last year Forward decided to enter the applications arena for the IBM and compatible audience, leading off with Cinco and following up with a word-processing application, Fast. The spreadsheet market is dominated by Focus Software, whose productFocus A-B-Chas an 80% market share. Focus A-B-C was released in 1981, shortly after the IBM personal computer (PC) was introduced, and the two products had an immediate symbiotic effect. The spreadsheet was a major advance over what was available at the time, but required the extra 16-bit processing power that the IBM PC offered. IBM, on the other hand, needed an application that would make its PC a "must buy." Sales of Focus A-B-C and the IBM PC took off as a result of their near-simultaneous release. At the time of its release, Focus A-B-C was a superb product, but it did have flaws. For example, because the software was copy-protected, it could be installed on a hard disk, but the original floppy disk had to be inserted each time before the software could run. Many users found this step an annoyance. Another problem with A-B-C was printing graphs. To print a graph, users had to exit the software and load a new program, called Printgraf, which then would print the graph. Finally, the product had a list price of $495, and the best discounted price available was approximately $300. However, Focus A-B-C had a unique menu system that was intuitive and easy to use. Pressing the slash key (/) displayed the menu system at the top of the spreadsheet. The menu allowed the user to make choices and provided a one-line explanation of each menu option. Compared to the cryptic commands or keystrokes users had to enter in other products, the Focus A-B-C menu system was a model of simplicity and clarity. Millions of users became accustomed to the menu system and hailed its use. Another advantage of Focus A-B-C was its ability to let users write their own macros. Literally a program, a macro allowed a user to automate spreadsheet tasks and then run them with a keystroke or two. In 1985, a small company named Discount Software introduced its own spreadsheet to the market. Called VIP Scheduler, the product looked and worked exactly the same as Focus A-B-C. Pressing the slash key displayed the identical menu as found in Focus A-B-C, and the product could read any macros developed with Focus A-B-C. VIP Scheduler was designed to look and work exactly like Focus A-B-C so that users would not have to learn a new system and could start productive work immediately. VIP Scheduler also offered two advantages over Focus A-B-C: its list price was $99, and the software was not copy-protected. Sales for VIP Scheduler were strong, but many consumers, perhaps feeling safer with the Focus name, did not buy the product, even though critical reviews were positive. VIP Scheduler did find a receptive market in academia. When Forward released its first spreadsheet product, Cinco, it was hailed by critics as a better all-around product than Focus A-B-C. It had better graphics, allowed users to print graphs from within Cinco, and was 100% compatible with Focus A-B-C. Cinco had its own menu system, which was as flexible as the Focus A-B-C system, but the menus Cases 799 CASE 15.3 and options were arranged more intuitively. For users who did not want to invest the time to learn a new menu system, Cinco could emulate the Focus A-B-C menu system. Both menus were activated by pressing the slash key, and users could specify easily which menu system they wanted. All macros written for Focus A-B-C ran perfectly on Cinco, provided that the Focus A-B-C menu system was being used. Because of favorable reviews and aggressive marketing by Forward, Cinco quickly gained market share. In a move that surprised the industry, Focus recently sued Discount Software, publisher of VIP Scheduler, for copyright infringement. Focus claimed that its menu system was an original work, and that VIP Scheduler, by incorporating that menu system in its product, had violated copyright laws. Focus claimed that the look and feel of its menu system could not be used in another product without permission. Sam is certain that Focus initiated this lawsuit because Cinco has made such dramatic progress in gaining a share of the spreadsheet market. Sam also is sure that Focus's target is not really VIP Scheduler, because it has such a small market share, but Cinco. After discussions with Forward's attorneys, Sam thinks that if he makes a quiet overture to Focus to settle out of court, Focus would be amenable to such a proposal. This would stave off potential negative publicity if Focus wins its suit against Discount Software and then follows up with a lawsuit against Forward. Based on projections of Cinco's sales, Forward's attorneys think that Focus could ask for $5, $8, or even $15 million in damages. Sam believes that the probability of Focus agreeing to $5 million is 50%, $8 million is 30%, and $15 million is 20%. Sam knows that settling now means an immediate loss of income, in the amount of one of the three estimates given, plus an admission of defeat and guilt for Forward. On the other hand, Sam could wait for the outcome of the Focus versus Discount Software unit. Forward's attorneys believe that Focus has a 40% chance of winning its lawsuit against Discount Software. With a win, Focus would have its legal precedent to sue Forward. It is by no means certain that Focus would institute a lawsuit against Forward because Forward is a much larger company than Discount Software and could afford a vigorous legal defense. Also the case against Forward is not as clear-cut, because Cinco has its own menu system as the primary mode of operation and offers the Focus A-B-C menu system for those who want to use it. VIP Scheduler provides only the Focus A-B-C menu system. However, Forward's attorneys believe there is an 80% chance that Focus would initiate a lawsuit against Forward if Focus wins its suit against Discount Software. Sam believes that even if Focus sues Forward, he could still try to settle the case out of court at that time or decide to go to trial. An attempt to settle out of court at that time would be more expensive for Forward because Focus would feel secure that it would win its case against Forward, already having won its lawsuit against Discount Software. Thus, Forward's attorneys think that Focus would settle for no less than $7 million, possibly asking for $10 million or even $12 million. The respective probabilities that Focus would settle for these amounts ($7, $10, and $12 million) are estimated to be 30%, 40%, and 30%. Also, Forward would have to pay its attorneys roughly $1 million to go through the settling process. However, if Focus sues Forward and Forward decides to go to trial instead of initiating settlement proceedings, Forward could lose the case. Forward's attorneys estimate there is an 80% chance that Forward would lose the trial, resulting in a judgment of either $10 million, $12 million, or $18 million against Forward, with probabilities of 10%, 20%, and 70%, respectively. The attorneys also estimate that their fees for a trial could reach $1.5 million. Use decision analysis to determine what Sam's optimal strategy should be. Create the decision tree for this problem, including all costs and probabilities, and find the optimal decision strategy and expected cost for that strategy. Consider Sam to be "risk neutral" in this analysis.

Please use Excel to solve it