The weighted voting systems for the voters A, B, C, ... are given in the form {g: w1, W2, W3, W4. ..,, Wn}. The weight of voter A is w1, the weight of voter B is w2, the weight of voter C is 3, and so on. Consider the weighted voting system {60: 5,55, 57}. (a) Compute the Banzhaf power index for each voter in this system. (Round your answers to the nearest hundredth.) BPI(A) = BPI(B) = BPI(C) = (b) Voter B has a weight of 53 compared to only 3 for voter A, yet the results of part (a) show that voter A and voter B both have the same Banzhaf power index. Explain why it seems reasonable, in this voting system, to assign voters A and B the same Banzhaf power index. O Despite the varied weights, in this system, all voters are dummy voters. No voter is critical to a successful outcome . O Despite the varied weights, in this system, all of the voters are needed for a quota. O Despite the varied weights, this is a majority system. Any two of the three voters are needed for a quota. O Despite the varied weights, this is a dictator system. Voter C controls the outcome, while voters A and B are dummy voters. O Despite the varied weights, this is a minority system. Any one of the three voters can stop a quota