There are 3 case study questions, i have provided the required readings with it. we are suppose to answer the case questions for 6.1, 7.1, 8.1

6.1

CASE STUDY

BREAKING A PROMISE TO PREVENT A LIE

AARON QUINN

Case Description

Journalism is replete with ethical controversy and never more than in the recent past. Special federal prosecutor Patrick J. Fitzgerald was assigned to investigate the senior Bush Administration source(s) who apparently leaked confidential information to journalists that potentially threatened national security and the safety of an undercover CIA agent.Subsequently, at least two journalists were ordered by a federal grand jury to reveal the confidential source (or sources) who leaked the identity of CIA agent Valerie Plame. Matthew Cooper of Time and Judith Miller of the The New York Times were ordered to reveal the identity of a source or sources who, apparently out of political revenge, leaked Plame's name to reporters because of her husband's role in publicly criticizing the Bush Administration's rationale for going to war in Iraq.

Plame's husband, Joseph C. Wilson, was com- missioned to investigate whether it was likely the pre-invasion Iraqi government either succeeded in or attempted to acquire uranium for the purpose of making weapons of mass destruction. After his investigation, Wilson concluded that there was no evidence to indicate that uranium had been acquired or sought by Iraqi government or military officials.

In an op-ed column he authored for The New York Times, Wilson criticized the Bush Administration for attempting to justify the invasion of Iraq on the grounds that it had, or was developing; weapons of mass destruction.The matter first gained prominence after Plame's name was published in a column written by conservative columnist Robert Novak, as it sparked worry in the intelligence community that there was a threat of further dangerous intelligence leaks. When con- rated by Fitzgerald, Novak agreed to give testimony about his source(s), but both Cooper and Miller inrially refused, citing their interest in maintaining their confidential agreements. Though Time and its reporter Matthew Cooper relented to the judicial pressure and the threat of imprisonment, Miller was eventually jailed for 85 days for her refusal to com- ply with the grand jury's order, despite having never published a story mentioning Plame.Fitzgerald, meanwhile, continues to seek in- formation about what role Vice President Dick Cheney's Chief of Staff, I. Lewis Libby, and senior Bush advisor Karl Rove, might have played in the leak. Though Libby claims he has not participated in leaking information, he was indicted on charges of obstruction of justice, perjury and making false statements. Rove, on the other hand, has not been charged as of early December 2005, but remains in- volved in an ongoing investigation. Several reporters, including Time's Viveca Novak (no relation to Robert Novak), told Fitzgerald that Rove was Cooper's source for information about Plame. Ethical Analysis There are a number of moral matters at issue in this case, and we will focus on those most crucial to journalists. First and foremost is the matter of whether journalists are always bound to keeping confidential agreements with sources. This of course raises matters both legal and moral. Legally, it has become increasingly common for journalists to make written agreements with confidential sources regarding the conditions of their confidentiality agreements. Miller claims to have been legally bound to maintain her confidentiality agreement based on one such contract, but later agreed to offer limited testimony once her source(s) relieved her of her contractual obligation. It is less clear with Cooper or either of the Novaks whether their agreements were written contracts or more traditional oral agreements.Nevertheless, there is the additional matter of what a journalist's moral obligation ought to be when confidential agreements bring about conflicting duties. On the one hand, journalists are mor- ally obligated to keep their promises, which includes maintaining confidentiality agreements to which they have agreed. On the other hand, there may be legitimate duties that conflict with keeping their confidentiality agreement, such as aiding law enforcement in bringing about justice when there are few or no alternative sources of information for authorities.In the Plame affair, many journalists and media crit- is alike have suggested that Miller's stronger duty might have been to reveal her confidential source(s) because maintaining the confidence would make her complicit in a moral and legal wrong- -leaking intelligence information that may threaten both national security and the safety of an innocent, Valerie Plame. 00 Journalists, as many of their ethics codes and traditions reveal, rarely if ever are comfortable in breaking confidentiality agreements. Most journalists think breaking confidences undermines the very trust on which journalism's social value rests. Conversely, many in the judiciary believe journalists have the same legal and moral obligation as all citizens, which is to comply with grand jury and judicial subpoenas that aim to bring justice. Ultimately, this impasse boils down to a disagreement about what moral costs journalists ought to incur in such moral conflicts does one risk losing public trust by breaking confidential agreements, or does one instead weaken the justice system by failing to contribute crucial information to it?Journalists have long argued that complying with subpoenas in instances in which they are not protected by "shield laws".- state statutes that sometimes allow journalists to refuse testimony without legal penalty- makes them an unofficial branch of law enforcement to be used (or abused) at will. Moreover, journalists have never had an official professional status-_ other than scattered shield laws--that recognizes them as anything other than ordinary citizens who have a legal and moral obligation as citizens to promote justice. Conversely, medical doctors and lawyers have a legal obligation to maintain confidential information about their patients and clients.Journalists' confusion about moral conflicts in confidential sourcing represents part of an interesting debate in professional ethics between what is commonly labeled role morality--following the moral mandates and guidelines specific to the goals and purposes of an occupation-_and universalizable ethics--mandates and guidelines to be followed in any circumstance, occupational or otherwise. As mentioned above, journalists are typically inclined to follow a journalistic role morality that emphasizes maintaining confidential agreements and by extension their public trust. Nevertheless, critics decry this steadfast adherence to journalistic convention because of its occasional luscrapatibiliy with de more universal pursuit of justice.

Study Questions

I. Should journalistsmaintain confidentialsources under all conditions, or are there circumstances that mitigate their promise equing obligations?

2.Should journalists make written contractual agreements with sources?

3. Are the contractual obligations of journalist (legal or moral) nullified when their sources le to or mislead them?

4.What is a more important goal for journalists when their journalistic duties conflict with their duties as ordinary citizens: to achieve ends that best advance the profession or to achieve ends that a good citizen would promote?

5. Should journalists be afforded special legal and social privileges like absolute shield laws because of their special duties related to informing the public?

Reading Assignment

This case describes a situation in which journalists' acclaimed obligation to protect the confidentiality of their sources conflicts with their purported obligation to aid legal authorities in the pursuit of justice. It is a noteworthy case in that the stakes are high: the journalists in question here (Matthew Cooper ofTimeand Judith Miller of theNew York Times) face the dilemma of either (a) cooperating with legal authorities by revealing their sources and effectively betraying the trust of these sources and also, to at least some extent, the trust of the public or (b) preserving the confidentiality of their sources at the expense of failing to help prevent harm to both US national security and an innocent person, CIA agent Valerie Plame. As Quinn suggests, this may be conceived of as a conflict between role morality and ordinary morality. On the one hand, we understand that journalists, insofar as they are citizens like the rest of us, have a moral obligation to uphold and, if possible, assist justice. On the other hand, we understand that journalistsquajournalists sometimes depend upon being able to promise confidentiality to informative sources in order to make available to the public news items that, allegedly, the public should receive.Most US states have shield laws of some kind protecting, to some degree, journalists and their sources, and in 2009, Bill H.R. 985: The Free Flow of Information Act was passed by the US House of Representatives. Even where there are US laws, however, these do not offer absolute protection but are qualified in various ways and subject to the court's consideration. For example, the US Court of Appeals has determined that the First Amendment does not support journalist privilege in cases where journalists are called upon to testify before grand juries, as in the case of Judith Miller. Currently, no provincial or federal laws specifically address the right of Canadian journalists to protect their sources, although some courts have judged in favour of such a right on the basis of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In both Canada and the United States, specific shield laws rooted in common law continue to be developed and debated.The ethical issues of whether shield laws should be established, who and what should be protected, and precisely what kinds of protection should be granted are all questions to be determined through discussion and debate at social, governmental, and legislative levels. Current legal realities and the answers to these questions are morally relevant for any journalist finding herself in the position of deciding whether or not to comply with court orders to disclose confidentialities, but so far there are no clear guidelines for journalists and they largely remain vulnerable to legal sanctions.

Questions for Case 6.1

1. Quinn explains (321-22) that some journalists argue that, without shield laws protecting them, journalists become "an unofficial branch of law enforcement to be used (or abused) at will." Explain what is meant by this and also explain whether you agree or disagree, and why.
2. Do you think that the public's trust in the journalism profession is undermined when journalists, under threat of legal sanctions including, possibly, imprisonment, break the promises of confidentiality they have made to their sources? Explain.
3. Answer Quinn's question 4 on p. 322.
4. Answer Quinn's question 5 on p. 322.

7.1

CASE STUDY

WILLFUL IGNORANCE AND

THE LIMITS OF ADVOCACY

HANS ALLHOFF

Case Description

Daniel Kellington was a lawyer in private practice in Medford, Oregon, specializing in personal injury law and trusts and estates.One Saturday afternoon, a United States Marshal phoned Kellington to tell him a former client of his, Richard Parker," was really Peter MacFarlane, a fugitive wanted in Vermont on drug trafficking charges.MacFarlane had been arrested in Appelgate, Oregon, was in jail, and wished to speak with Kellington. Kellington took his call. He had represented MacFarlane about a year previously in a few matters connected with MacFarlane's business, Metalhead Boat Works.Kellington toldMacFarlane he was not a criminal lawyer, but agreed to visit MacFarlane anyway regarding, inMacFarlane's words, "some matters related to a boat business." Their meeting lasted for about ten minutes. MacFarlane admitted to Kellington he was in fact Peter MacFarlane and not Richard Parker. He also told him he owed time for a prior drug conviction and intended to serve it. MacFarlane then asked Kellington to contact an employee named Norm Young, and to have Young remove some things from MacFarlane's home. Those thingsincluded: stereo equipment, files, a black attach case, money stuffed underneath a mattress, a laptop computer, electronic organizers, and a boat. In addition, MacFarlane wrote out some instructions for Young, which read, "Chair in bedroom, right side of arm, envelope. Please destroy as soon as possible."Kellington returned to his office, immediately called Young, and began to pass on instructions from his conversation with MacFarlane. Young asked himhow he should destroy the envelope; Kellington said he could burn it. Young also asked Kellington why he was calling him and not Mr. "Parker"; Kellington told him Mr. "Parker" was in jail, but said nothing more. When Young asked Kellington if he could get into any kind of trouble for doing what MacFarlane was asking of him, Kellington told him he could not--but also to stop if he ran into police or "some- body bigger than you.Young, more or less, did as he was instructed. But, after discovering a driver's license with MacFarlane's picture and another name (not Parker or MacFarlane) in the envelope he was told to burn, as well as $20,000 in cash in a bag he removed, Young panicked and drove home. When he later drove back to MacFarlane's house to put things back in their place, he was confronted by federal officials who were there to exe- cute a search warrant. Young told them what, through Kellington, MacFarlane had instructed him to do.The federal officials then arranged for Young to initiate a tape-recorded phone call to Kellington.During this call, Young told Kellington about the fake I.D. and the large amount of money. When Kellington asked Young if he had "heard from any- body" Young said he had not. Kellington thensuggested they take an inventory of everything, and he would then take possession. When Young asked Kellington whether they should report this to authorities, Kellington said, "Well, I don't think you have to do that." Kellington said, "I have a dury to my client to protect his assets that, that they can't get and when they... If they, if somebody uh, come and, comes and says they were attaching that money because it's ill-gotten gains or something.... Well then I have to turn it over to them, but in the meantime it's his money, and it's his money and he may need to defend uh, you know pay a lawyer." When Kellington left Young's house with MacFarlane's belongings, federal agents detained him.

Ethical Analysis

These facts, names included, are taken almost verbatim from a real case, United States v. Kellington, in which Kellington was arrested and, along with MacFarlane, charged with obstructing justice by "knowingly .. engaging in misleading conduct to- ward another person, with intent to alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in anofficial proceeding."At trial, Kellington played dumb. For all he knew, the envelope he was directing Young to destroy contained a love letter. In hindsight, he admitted, he should have been more inquisitive of MacFarlane's demands, but when he and MacFarlane met he assumed MacFarlane merely wanted to make sure his things were in good hands. Why did he tell Young so little? Because, Kellington maintained, it is his pol- icy not to disclose to third parties information he learns in confidence from clients.The real issue at trial, and on appeal, was whether Kellington, unlike MacFarlane, could avail himself of a defense grounded in legal ethics norms. Specifically, the trial judge, in his instruction to the jury, said, "[T]his is not a case on legal lawyer ethics. A crime has been charged and I'm not going to permit ethics type of arguments here." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this framing. An expert on legal ethics had testified on Kellington's behalf, and the Ninth Circuit thought his testimony was quite relevant: "When you have a lawyer who has been in private practice on the civil side and Mr. Kellington has been for the better part of 30 years it does not come as a surprise to me that in this context he did not immediately flash upon what I think would be known to you or to maybe others, that, by God, this is a- you know, I'm being asked to destroy evidence here.?" On this analysis, Kellingtons ignorance, naivet-call it what you will-coupled with his sense of client loyalty, would seem to rebut an obstruction of justice charge.

Study Questions

I. During his taped phone conversation with Youne, Young asked Kellington whether they should alert authorities, against what MacFarlane's wishes obviously would have been. Kellington replied, "I have a duty to my client to protect his assets that, that they can't get and when they If they, if somebody uh, come and, comes and says hey we're attaching that money because it's ill-gotten gains or something ... Well then I have to turn it over to them, but in the meantime it's his money, and it's his money and he may need to defend uh, you know pay a lawyer." What do you make of Kellington's response? Can Kellington's claim of navet be accepted?

2.It certainly would not have been a crime for Kellington to have gone straight to the police after his initial phone conversation with MacFarlane.Should he have? Or are you satisfied with a rule saying, "If you're a lawyer and you don't know what your client is asking you to do is illegal, you can go ahead and do it??

3.Kellington said MacFarlane was a client of his.But was he? Once a lawyer for MacFarlane, always a lawyer for MacFarlane? Doesn't this amount to conscripting Kellington into an ethical dilemma?

4.In connection with this case and the readings in this section, ask yourself whether lawyering requires an ethics of its own. Is common-sense moral philosophy just not enough? Do we want lawyers to have certain moral duties and exemptions beyond those we have as ordinary people?

Reading Assignment

It is tempting to think of the case of Daniel Kellington and the Oregon State Bar as ethically simple, even though it became complicated in relation to rendering a legal judgment. It is tempting, that is, to think that Kellington's actions were obviously morally wrong. But were they? We know that Norm Young, the person instructed to remove MacFarlane's items and destroy the contents of the envelope, recognized the situation as dubious. If Young understood that the actions he was asked to undertake were morally and legally problematic, then Kellington, a legal expert, should have clued in too, right? However, the appellate court judged it reasonable that Kellington was unaware of the fact that he was involving himself in illegal activities and also judged Kellington's sense of commitment to his client appropriate.

This case highlights several of the issues we have discussed in this unit. First, there are considerations about Kellington's responsibilities and obligations to MacFarlane, his former client. If all persons should be presumed innocent until proven guilty, wasn't it right for Kellington to assume first-off that MacFarlane's requests were "on the up and up," and wasn't it right, moreover, for Kellington to advocate for MacFarlane by helping him?

The second issue this case highlights is the widespread view that criminal law and non-criminal law are quite different and that distinct kinds of ethical considerations pertain to each of these two general areas of our legal system. According to the appellate court, it was significant that Kellington lacked experience in criminal law, since this fact lent credence to his ostensible navet.

Overall, this case underscores considerations about the legitimacy of conflicts between professional legal ethics and ordinary ethics. Oftentimes when a lawyer, entrenched in his profession, transgresses ordinary values, there is a genuine question about whether his professional values and his professional experience rightfully excuse him from his supposed wrongdoing. Whether or not a lawyer is blameworthy will depend, at least sometimes, on whether his intensions and actions satisfy tenets of professionalism, even if, in the given situation, these professional tenets oppose ordinary morality.

Questions for Case 7.1

1. Should Kellington have considered himself to have a professional responsibility toward MacFarlane at the time of MacFarlane's call? If so, explain what Kellington's responsibility was. If not, explain why he should have considered himself without responsibility toward MacFarlane. (It may be useful here to employ Kipnis's guidelines for ascribing moral responsibilities to the legal profession from Unit 3.)
2. Do you think that Kellington's lack of experience in criminal law should count in favour of his defence that he was unaware of being asked to involve himself in illegalities such as destroying evidence? Defend your view.
3. Kellington successfully appealed his initial conviction of obstructing justice. All things considered, do you think that this final legal judgment in his favour represents "a disconnect" between legal ethics and ordinary ethics? If you think so, explain your reasons for thinking this is ethically acceptable or not in this case specifically. If you think not, explain why you think that legal ethics and ordinary ethics turn out to be compatible in their applications to this case.

8.1

CASE STUDY

EARNINGS AND ETHICS: THINKING

ABOUT ENRON

Case Description

In 1985, Kenneth Lay founded Enron Corporation in Omaha, Nebraska. At a later date, its corporate headquarters was relocated to Houston, Texas. As a public corporation in the energy industry Enron employed approximately 21,000 workers by the end of 2001, and was the seventh largest company in the United States. It claimed to have earned sr01 billion in profits in 2000, and enjoyed a reputation of stability and financial success in the business sector.

or Such a reputation included earning the title of "America's Most Innovative Company" by Fortune magazine from 1996 to 2001, and a place on the magazine's list of "I00 Best Companies to Work for in America" in 2000. Enron's profits in the stock market also enhanced this reputation. The corpora- ton repeatedly garnered substantial financial earnings, and in 2000 its stock soared to a selling price of

$85 per share. By all appearances Enron was a thriving business, and its future prospects looked promising in the eyes of its investors and employees.

Enron stunned the global market by filing for bankruptcy in the end of 2001, however, amid controversy of its accounting practices. Investigations into the matter led to allegations of fraud, where Enron exaggerated its earnings in reports, and simultaneously buried its debts and losses in an assortment of subsidiary partnerships known as the Raptors.

Until this time the general public had little reason to doubt Enron's reported financial transactions and success. Now, however, questions are being asked regarding the appropriateness of removing expenses from a parent company's ledgers to that of its subsidiary to generate a more optimistic picture of the parent company's success. Enron's chief executive officers Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling went to trial in answer to the above charge in January 2006. The trial is still underway at the time of this study.

Enron's actual financial performance in 2000 was poor, in contrast to what was reported. This was due, in part, to high risk ventures that didnot perform as well as expected. Such monetary losses amounted to millions of dollars in US currency, and affected investors and Enron employees alike.

Company executives are paying back investors, but Enron's employees are not as fortunate. Since Enron stock was hit hard by the controversy, Enron employee benefits dependent on the company's stock were completely exhausted. Thus all employee retirement savings via the company's 401k program were lost, and apart from litigation such monies will not be restored.

Enron still manages some of its accounts until the company can be divided into smaller organizations in the industry. About 300 people are in its current employ.

Ethical Analysis

One feature that is essential to understanding what is at stake in the Enron case is to recognize what a subsidiary partnership is and how these are typically used by corporations. Subsidiary partnerships, of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs), are a type of fund Or trust that is created by a parent company with an aim toward starting a new type of business venture. Such trusts allow the company to pursue these new business ventures with minimal risk attached.

That is, if the new project does not work out financially, and the trust is drained, this will not jeopardize the parent company's financial status, because the very nature of SPEs prevents this. One advantage of such a financial entity, then, is to encourage a business's growth and development into new areas.

of industry.Such financial ingenuity has other benefits as well. By creating a SPE, the parent company can gain a loan at a lower interest rate from a lender via a SPE, than the parent company could obtain through the lender otherwise. For the newly created SPE will have no debt from the parent company, enabling it to secure the loan. SPEs also afford a parent corporation the option of legitimately removing its debts and losses from its reports to its subsidiary accounts, and avoid reports that would show a decrease in earnings. Such moves appear to be in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, (GAAP), which are a standard set of reporting rules for companies to follow.

Enron used SPEs to both boost earnings in re- ports and remove its debts and losses, making the crux of the issue whether or not ailing financial corporations should be able to use such accounting methods to make their numbers appear more attractive to investors than they might actually be.

One element worth noting is that by using SPEs in this manner a company like Enron acquires an un- fair market advantage over that of its competitors.

This lack of candor in not reporting its earnings and losses in a more straightforward fashion gives a false impression of the company's performance, by making it appear more successful than it actually is.

Considering that investors are interested in thriving companies that generate profit, Enron would draw out more hopeful investors with money to spend and gain more earnings than its competitors through this technique. Also instructive is considering the other side of the issue. One of the commonly touted reasons for entering business is to make a profit. Surely there are times when a lack of candor is called for in such an industry. This is not uncommon. For example, one's resume will often include achievements and highlight one's skills. No one would seriously con- sider mentioning one's weaknesses and failures on such a document. The expectation is to advertise in a fashion that would aid your objective: in this case getting the applied-for position. It may be that Enron's use of SPEs is not much different than another company's sale pitch, but simply uses its numbers to make its point.

Study Questions

I. Imagine that the public never discovered Enron's reporting technique. Let's also say that Enron was able to pay off all its losses and debts through this strategy, and make a substantial profit. Would such a strategy be a moral course of action? Why or why not?

2.

When is candor expected in the business world, and when is it not? Are there other occasions outside of one's job when one would not want to be candid with others? When? How does this dynamic change in relation to those closest to you?

3.

Would your opinion of Enron change if it retracted its earlier reports and fully disclosed its financial gains and losses while at the height of its popularity and purported earnings? Does changing the timing of this disclosure change the morality of the situation? If so, how?

4.

In what ways is Enron's use of SPEs similar to forms of advertising? In what ways is it not?

Why or why not?

READING ASSIGNMENT

Since the time that Daniel J. Wirth's description of the Enron case was published in our textbook, more information has accumulated. As Wirth's description suggests, it is reasonable to think that Enron's former employees have suffered the most. More than 20,000 employees lost their jobs and many of these lost their life savings as well, since their retirement funds were tied to the company's stock through a 401(k). At the time of Enron's bankruptcy, employees' retirement investments totalled about $1.3 billion US. Just before this time, however, Jeffrey Skilling and other company executives sold their Enron stock at a substantial profit. Skilling, for example, sold $60 million US of his stock. In 2006, however, Skilling was found guilty on nineteen charges, including conspiracy, insider trading, making false statements to auditors, and securities fraud. He was sentenced to a twenty-four-year prison term^[19]and fined $45 million US. On April 6, 2011, the court ruled against his appeal of this conviction.

Another key player was Enron's founder and former CEO, Kenneth Lay. In 2006, he was convicted of ten counts of securities fraud and related offences and given twenty to thirty years in jail. He died of a heart attack, however, three months before his sentencing, and his conviction was subsequently vacated (that is, voided from legal record) by the presiding judge on the grounds that Lay, because he was dead, was unable to exercise his right to appeal his convictions.

After selling off major divisions of the parent company, Enron changed its name, in 2007, to Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation. This vestige of Enron aims to pay off the company's creditors and conclude other aspects of its business associations. The lost retirement savings of former employees is not among the corporation's concerns, however.

In his analysis of this case, Wirth explains Special Purpose Entities, SPEs (also commonly called Special Purpose Vehicles, SPVs). Companies create SPEs to pursue new business ventures while keeping the finances of those ventures distinct from those of their primary business and, in effect, protecting the primary business from risk. Because the new venture is launched under a separate partnership, its assets and liabilities are not carried on the books of the parent company but are carried on a separate balance sheet. It is easy to see why this type of arrangement is permitted, as it can serve legitimate purposes. Allowing companies to create SPEs is a way of encouraging them to diversify and to innovate and to thus create value for all stakeholders including society, which benefits from ventures that succeed. However, as we learned through Enron and other corporate debacles, SPEs can be abused so that employees, investors, the public, and others are deceived about the financial reality of the parent company. The fact that SPEs can be and have been abused (and abused to a point where the overall effects are devastating) provides us with some reason to question whether this sort of arrangement should be permitted.

For Enron, SPEs were importantly strategic, enabling executives to successfully carry out their "lack of candour."^[20]Among the glut of ethical issues in Enron is the issue of the extent to which we, society, should tolerate lacks of candour in business. Clearly we have tolerated considerably less than complete honesty and openness in business. We consider lacks of candour acceptable in many ways and, sometimes, even good. Along this line of reasoning, Wirth provides an example of one providing a resum that is reasonable and (at least, seemingly) unproblematic even though less than completely forthright. As he suggests, we should think carefully about whether dishonesty and evasiveness in corporate accounting is or is not worthy of the same kind of tolerance.

Questions for Case 8.1

1. Suppose problems of the kind we saw with Enron could be mostly averted through placing greater restrictions and stricter regulations on companies with respect to SPEs. Should we so restrict and regulate all companies in order to preclude the possibility that a small minority of companies would abuse SPEs? Explain your reasoning.
2. Answer question 1 that Wirth poses on p. 141.
3. Answer question 4 that Wirth poses on p. 141.