There are N potential voters. To exercise the right to vote, each of them has to incur a cost of x = U2 (think of it as opportunity cost of time), otherwise she abstains and cannot aect the outcome. There are two candidates, Gingrich and Romney. Each potential voter can be either type g or type r. Type g (r) voter prefers Gingrich (Romney) and receives a payo of 1 if Gingrich (Romney) wins and 0 otherwise. There are G potential voters of type g (G 3' 10) and R voters of type r (R i\"? 10), and G + R = N. The winner of the election is determined by majority rule: a candidate wins for sure if more voter vote for him than his rival, and in case of a tie each candidate wins with probability U2. (a) Form it as a game: for each player dene the strategy space and hisfher oavos as a function of all olavers' strategies