There are two players in this game. They both think that nature selects payoff matrix A with probability % and B with probability %. If nature selects A, then players 1 and 2 interact according to matrix "A.\" If nature selects B, then the players interact according to matrix \"B". These matrices are pictured here. 1. When the players choose their actions, the players do not know which matrix they are playing. That is, they think that with probability % the payoffs are as in matrix A and that with probability % the payoffs are as in matrix B. Write the Bayesian normalform matrix that describes this Bayesian game. (This matrix is the "average" of matrices A and B.) Is the resulting Bayesian game dominancesolvable? What is your prediction of the strategy prole that is played? 2. The game is different in this one: Before the players select their actions, Player 1 observes nature's choice. (That is, player 1 knows which matrix is being played.) Player 2 does not observe nature's choice. Represent this game in the sequential (extensive) form and in the Bayesian normal form. Is the resulting game dominancesolvable? What is your prediction of the strategy prole that is played? 3. In this example, is the statement "A player benefits from having more information" true or false